United Nations S/2017/743

Security Council

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The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on Lebanon, in particular resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978), 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), 1701 (2006), 1773 (2007), 1832 (2008), 1884 (2009), 1937 (2010) and 2004 (2011), 2064 (2012), 2115 (2013), 2172 (2014) and 2236 (2015) as well as the statements of its President on the situation in Lebanon and the Press statement dated 19 December 2016,

Welcoming the continued progress towards genuine reactivation of the Lebanese state institutions: the election of a President of the Republic of Lebanon, the nomination of a President of the Council of Ministers, the formation of a national unity government and the adoption of a new electoral law as well as the announcement of the upcoming legislative elections in Lebanon,

Responding to the request of the Government of Lebanon to extend the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for a period of one year without amendment presented in a letter from the Lebanese Foreign Minister to the Secretary-General of 1st of August 2017 and welcoming the letter from the Secretary-General to its President of 4 August 2017 (S/2017/680) recommending this extension,

Reiterating its strong support for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon,

Reaffirming its commitment to the full implementation of all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006), and aware of its responsibilities to help secure a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in the resolution,

Expressing concern at the limited progress made towards the establishment of a permanent ceasefire and other key provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) more than ten years after its adoption,

Calling upon all concerned parties to strengthen their efforts, including by exploring concrete solutions with the Special Coordinator of the Secretary-General and the UNIFIL Force Commander, to fully implement all provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) without delay,

Expressing deep concern at all violations in connection with resolution 1701 (2006) in particular the incidents which occurred on 20 April 2017 as underlined by the Secretary General in his report, commending the immediate reaction of the Lebanese authorities and recalling the importance of control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory,

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Underlining the risk that violations of the cessation of hostilities could lead to a new conflict that none of the parties or the region can afford,

Urging all parties to make every effort to ensure that the cessation of hostilities is sustained, exercise maximum calm and restraint and refrain from any action or rhetoric that could jeopardize the cessation of hostilities or destabilize the region,

Emphasizing to all parties the importance of full compliance with the prohibition on sales and supply of arms and related materiel established by resolution 1701 (2006),

Recalling the utmost importance that all parties concerned respect the Blue Line in its entirety, *welcoming* the continued progress in the marking of the Blue Line, and *encouraging* the parties to accelerate their efforts in coordination with UNIFIL, including through the tripartite mechanism, to continue working in the ongoing process to delineate and visibly mark the Blue Line in its entirety, as well as to move forward on the marking of its points of contention, as recommended by the Strategic Review,

Condemning in the strongest terms all attempts to threaten the security and stability of Lebanon,

Reaffirming its determination to ensure that no such acts of intimidation prevent UNIFIL from implementing its mandate in accordance with Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), and *recalling* the necessity for all parties to ensure that UNIFIL personnel are secure and their freedom of movement is fully respected and unimpeded,

Recalling the relevant principles contained in the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,

Commending the active role and dedication of the personnel of UNIFIL and expressing its strong appreciation to Member States that contribute to UNIFIL and *underlining* the necessity that UNIFIL has at its disposal all necessary means and equipment to carry out its mandate,

Recalling the request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, and *reaffirming* UNIFIL's authority to take all necessary action in areas of operations of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind and to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its mandate,

Welcoming the crucial role played by the Lebanese Armed Forces and security forces in extending and sustaining the authority of the Government of Lebanon, in particular in southern Lebanon, and responding to other security challenges, including the threat of terrorism, and the strong international commitment to support the Lebanese Armed Forces, which has helped strengthen the capability of the Lebanese Armed Forces to provide security for Lebanon,

Welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General to keep all peacekeeping operations, including UNIFIL, under close review, and *stressing the need* for the Council to pursue a rigorous, strategic approach to peacekeeping deployments,

Recognizing the need to regularly review all peacekeeping operations to ensure efficiency and effectiveness, *including* reviews of UNIFIL when appropriate, taking into account developments on the ground,

Bearing in mind the strategic priorities and recommendations identified by the Secretary-General in his letter of 12 March 2012 (S/2012/151) as a result of the

Strategic Review of UNIFIL, *taking note* of his letter of 8 March 2017 (S/2017/202) as a result of the most recent Strategic Review of UNIFIL, and *expressing* the need for a follow-up and update,

Calling upon Member States to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces as needed to enable it to perform its duties in line with resolution 1701 (2006),

Determining that the situation in Lebanon continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend the present mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2018;

2. *Commends* the positive role of UNIFIL, whose deployment together with the Lebanese Armed Forces has helped to establish a new strategic environment in southern Lebanon, *welcomes* the expansion of coordinated activities between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces, and *calls for* further enhancement of this cooperation;

3. *Affirms* its strong continuing commitment to the existing UNIFIL mandate and *calls* for the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006);

4. *Reiterates* its call for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution based on the principles and elements set out in paragraph 8 of resolution 1701 (2006);

5. *Reaffirms* the necessity of an effective and durable deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces in southern Lebanon and the territorial waters of Lebanon at an accelerated pace to fully implement the provisions of resolution 1701 (2006) and requests the Secretary-General to include in his future reports assessments of progress made in this regard and *calls* for renewed engagement of UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in the Strategic Dialogue, which aims at carrying out analysis of ground forces and maritime assets and setting a series of benchmarks reflecting the correlation between the capacities and responsibilities of UNIFIL vis-à-vis those of the Lebanese Armed Forces, with precise timelines to be jointly and promptly elaborated by the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Secretary-General, with a view to identifying Lebanese Armed Forces progress in implementing tasks mandated in resolution 1701 (2006);

6. *Welcomes* in this regard the intention of the Government of Lebanon to deploy a model regiment and of an offshore patrol vessel in UNIFIL's area of operations to advance the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and the authority of the Lebanese State as noted in the 2016-2017 Strategic Review;

7. *Urges* further international support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, in response to the capabilities development plan of the Lebanese Armed Forces, as well as in the framework of the International Support Group for Lebanon, through additional and expedited assistance in areas where the Lebanese Armed Forces are most critically in need of support, including counter-terrorism and border protection;

8. *Strongly calls upon* all parties to respect the cessation of hostilities, to prevent any violation of the Blue Line and to respect it in its entirety and to cooperate fully with the United Nations and UNIFIL;

9. *Welcomes* the constructive role played by the Tripartite Mechanism in facilitating coordination and in de-escalating tensions, which has helped to further stabilize the situation along the Blue Line and build trust between the parties, and *expresses* in this regard strong support for the efforts of UNIFIL to engage with both parties to facilitate liaison, coordination, and practical arrangements on the ground

and to continue to ensure that the Tripartite Mechanism enables the parties to discuss a wider range of issues;

10. *Urges* all parties to abide scrupulously by their obligation to respect the safety of UNIFIL and other United Nations personnel and to ensure that the freedom of movement of UNIFIL is fully respected and unimpeded, in conformity with its mandate and its rules of engagement including by avoiding any course of action which endangers United Nations personnel, and in this regard, calls for further cooperation between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces in particular regarding coordinated and adjacent patrols, *welcomes* the commitment of the Lebanese authorities to protect UNIFIL movements and *reiterates its call* for the rapid finalization of the investigation launched by Lebanon regarding the 27 May, 26 July and 9 December 2011 attacks in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of these attacks;

11. *Urges* all parties to cooperate fully with the Security Council and the Secretary-General to make tangible progress towards a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution as envisioned in resolution 1701 (2006) and on all outstanding issues in the implementation of Security Council resolutions 1701 (2006), 1680 (2006) and 1559 (2004), and other relevant Security Council resolutions;

12. *Urges* the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL, which has actively engaged Israel and Lebanon to facilitate such a withdrawal;

13. *Reaffirms* its call on all States to fully support and respect the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL;

14. Acting in support of a request from the Government of Lebanon to deploy an international force to assist it to exercise its authority throughout the territory, *recalls its authorization to* UNIFIL to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to ensure that its area of operations is not utilized for hostile activities of any kind, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council, and to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;

15. *Requests* the Secretary General to look at ways to enhance UNIFIL's efforts as regards paragraph 12 of resolution 1701 (2006) and paragraph 14 of this resolution, including ways to increase UNIFIL's visible presence, including through patrols and inspections, within its existing mandate and capabilities;

16. *Recalls* the decision that UNIFIL shall assist the government of Lebanon, at its request, as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 1701 (2006) and within its capabilities, to implement resolution 1701 (2006);

17. *Welcomes* the efforts being undertaken by UNIFIL to implement the Secretary-General's zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to ensure full compliance of its personnel with the United Nations code of conduct, requests the Secretary-General to continue to take all necessary action in this regard and to keep the Security Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take preventive and disciplinary action to ensure that such acts are properly investigated and punished in cases involving their personnel;

18. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), every four months, or at any time as he deems appropriate, and to include in his reporting a prompt and detailed breakdown of all resolution 1701 (2006) violations, prompt and detailed reports on violations of the sovereignty of Lebanon, prompt and detailed reports on the restrictions to UNIFIL's freedom of movement, reports on specific areas where UNIFIL does not access and on the reasons behind these restrictions, potential risks to the cessation of hostilities and UNIFIL's response as well as reports on the implementation of the recommendations of the 2016-2017 Strategic review and on additional identified efficiencies to most appropriately fulfil its mandated tasks; requests the Secretary-General to further develop a reporting mechanism in order to provide concrete and detailed information on the aforementioned issues to the Council;

19. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003 and 1850 (2008) of 16 December 2008;

20. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Report of the Secretary-General on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including on the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement by the President of the Security Council of 16 December 2014 (S/PRST/2014/27) in which the Security Council requested me to submit to it an annual report on ways to strengthen the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including on the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU). An update is provided in the present report on ongoing efforts to scale up the partnership between the two organizations and the activities of UNOAU in that regard since the issuance of the previous report in September 2016 (S/2016/780).

II. Strategic partnership of the United Nations and the African Union

2. The increasingly complex and often interconnected conflict situations in Africa have necessitated closer collaboration and partnership between the United Nations and the African Union at all levels. The collaboration is underpinned by the shared values enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitutive Act of the African Union, as well as by the recognition of the interdependence and complementarity of the two organizations in addressing peace and security challenges in Africa. During the reporting period, the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa reached several important milestones.

United Nations Security Council and African Union Peace and Security Council

3. The United Nations Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council adopted significant decisions that advanced the strategic cooperation between the two organizations. In its resolution 2320 (2016), the Security Council commended the progress made in the United Nations-African Union partnership and stressed the need to further develop it into a more systematic

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and strategic one adapted to the complex security challenges facing the continent. Similarly, the Peace and Security Council, in its communiqués of 29 September and 30 May, commended the progress made and reiterated the need to enhance its partnership with the United Nations in accordance with the principles of comparative advantage, division of labour, burden-sharing and consultative decision-making.

4. Coherence in the decision-making of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council on issues on the agenda of both organizations remains critical for achieving greater strategic convergence and impact. Members of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council will hold their eleventh annual joint consultative meeting on 7 and 8 September in Addis Ababa. Enhanced dialogue on decision-making between the two Councils will improve the collective ability to respond to the many peace and security challenges in Africa. In their previous consultative meeting, held in New York on 23 May 2016, which marked the tenth anniversary of the annual consultations, the two Councils stressed the need for renewed efforts to enhance their partnership so as to ensure greater synergies and coherence and a more effective response to the challenges facing the African continent (see S/2017/248, annex).

5. In the report of the Secretary-General on options for authorization and support for African Union peace support operations (S/2017/454), I proposed a framework for decision-making as well as tools for African Union peace support operations authorized by the Security Council that could further support Member States in making informed decisions with a view to addressing any given situation and helping to ensure the coordinated undertaking of mandated tasks by the two bodies.

6. To further promote collaboration between the two Councils, the Committee of Experts of the African Union Peace and Security Council participated in a training workshop at United Nations Headquarters from 28 November to 2 December. The initiative was aimed at developing a deeper understanding of the working methods and mandate of the Security Council among African Union representatives and enhancing the working relationship between the two Councils.

7. The three African members of the Security Council, known as the A3, have continued to play a critical bridging role, providing briefings every two months to the Peace and Security Council to promote common African positions and coordination of the Councils. The fourth high-level seminar on peace and security in Africa was held in December in Oran, Algeria, with the participation of the A3, the Peace and Security Council and African Union Commission. The importance of coordination among the members of the A3 to ensure the effective articulation and promotion of Africa's views within the Security Council on issues of interest to the continent was highlighted. Several coordination meetings of representatives of the monthly president of the Security Council and the Chair of the Peace and Security Council were also held.

United Nations Secretariat and African Union Commission

8. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission and I have prioritized the furthering of our partnership in a systematic, predictable and strategic manner, on the basis of the principles of mutual respect and comparative advantage. In my first address to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the twenty-eighth African Union Summit, on 30 January, I committed to a new era of cooperation and pledged to contribute to changing the narrative about Africa, to work in support of the African Union's efforts to promote unity and progress and to establish a higher platform of cooperation that recognizes Africa's assets and enormous potential.

9. In that spirit, on 19 April the Chairperson and I convened the first annual United Nations-African Union conference at United Nations Headquarters to facilitate, at the highest levels of the two organizations, a shared understanding of the root causes and drivers of conflict and to promote convergence in decision-making. To underscore our organizations' reinvigorated partnership, the Chairperson and I signed the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, which includes four key action areas: preventing and mediating conflict and sustaining peace; responding to conflict; addressing root causes; and continuously reviewing and enhancing the partnership. It provides a comprehensive strategic vision for a stronger partnership as we jointly address peace and security challenges across the continent. On the basis of the joint framework, I have kept in close contact with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, and the Deputy Secretary-General and relevant Under-Secretaries-General continue to consult regularly with African Union commissioners and envoys. The Deputy Secretary-General's participation at the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the African Union Assembly, on 3 and 4 July, further reinforced the Organization's strategic dialogue with the Union.

10. With a view to facilitating the implementation of the joint framework, the Secretariat set up an internal working group for enhanced partnership with the African Union in the area of peace and security, while the African Union Commission established a framework implementation task team. The teams, which held several meetings during the reporting period, will play a key role in coordinating the implementation of the joint framework, including through strengthening strategic coherence and operational collaboration and partnership throughout conflict cycles in Africa.

11. Meanwhile, in the context of the joint framework, my special representatives and envoys have continued to collaborate with and complement the efforts of African Union special envoys and representatives, including in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Gambia, Libya, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan. During the period under review, United Nations representatives provided 40 briefings to the Peace and Security Council. Similarly, African Union commissioners, representatives and envoys briefed the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies on issues on the Council's agenda. This practice has facilitated consultation between the two organizations and contributed to greater alignment in the decisions of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council. Another concrete step in the strengthening of cooperation at the political level between the Secretariat and the Commission has been the issuance of joint communiqués on the situations in, inter alia, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and the Gambia.

12. In addition, staff from both organizations continued to work collaboratively on issues of mutual interest. On 13 and 14 December, more than 50 officers of the two organizations participated in the annual United Nations-African Union consultative ("desk-to-desk") meeting on the prevention and management of conflict. The meeting provided an opportunity to exchange information, coordinate positions and develop joint implementation strategies. Director-level videoconferences, which were pivotal for sharing information and promoting common understanding and action on ongoing conflicts, were held throughout the year.

13. The African Union Commission has sought United Nations assistance to help develop its own mission-support capacity, and as a result the Department of Field Support has, since September, included Commission personnel in the one-year senior mission administration and resource training programme, designed to develop mission-support leadership skills. In addition, the Department and the Commission initiated a staff-exchange programme, with the first set of exchanges, in the areas of

human resources and budget and finance, completed in early 2017 and the second set, in the areas of logistics and information and communications technology, scheduled to take place in the second half of 2017.

III. Operational partnership of the United Nations and the African Union

Challenges to peace and security in Africa

14. The African Union and the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms took decisive steps towards unity, peace and prosperity for all people on the continent. Among other measures to effectively address peace and security challenges in Africa, the African Union Assembly, at its twenty-eighth ordinary session, held on 30 and 31 January, endorsed the African Union Master Road Map of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020 (Lusaka Master Road Map), which had been adopted by the Peace and Security Council in November 2016. On the ground, the combined and concerted efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union and international partners, including the United Nations, helped to avert a conflict in the Gambia following the refusal of former President Yahya Jammeh to accept the results of the December 2016 election. The resolution of the crisis in the Gambia represents a clear example of successful, cost-effective conflict prevention, which is possible when the regional and subregional bodies have a common understanding with the United Nations about the crisis and a unified approach to its resolution.

15. In addition, during the period under review, Somalia continued to register progress in building its federal system and implementing its political road map, thanks to the concerted efforts of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the United Nations.

16. In a number of countries, however, challenges remained. As highlighted by the Peace and Security Council in a press statement in April 2015, among the key drivers of conflict on the continent are marginalization, abuse of human rights, refusal to accept electoral defeat, manipulation of constitutions, mismanagement and unequal distribution of resources, lack of socioeconomic opportunities and unemployment, and corruption. The situation is compounded by the negative impacts of such global phenomena as terrorism and transnational organized crime. As in other parts of the world, international human rights law and international humanitarian law are violated by some Governments and non-State actors in Africa.

17. The conflict in South Sudan has resulted in immense suffering and the unprecedented displacement of civilian populations. Political crises in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon and Guinea-Bissau required sustained diplomatic engagement to prevent further escalation. Governments continued to face challenges in addressing the threats of terrorism and violent extremism, most notably in Libya, the Sahel region, the Lake Chad basin and Somalia. It is of grave concern that terrorist organizations have become highly adaptable, expanding territory under their control, uprooting communities, enslaving people, in particular women and children, and committing other heinous crimes. In response to that challenge, the Peace and Security Council in May declared terrorism to be a serious threat to peace and security in parts of the continent. Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram remained active in Somalia and the Lake Chad basin, respectively, and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Daesh) was able to establish a foothold in northern Mali and Libya, from which they also posed a security threat to neighbouring countries.

18. Despite the ongoing efforts to grapple with piracy, the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Guinea have seen a resurgence of attacks. The implementation of the Yaoundé process on maritime safety and security has been lukewarm, while the Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development has so far been ratified by only one country. Meanwhile, in the hinterland, transhumance issues have become increasingly acute as a result of population pressure as well as unpredictable climate dynamics. During the reporting period, deadly clashes occurred between cultivators and pastoralists in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and the Sudan. The situation was exacerbated by the proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons, as well as ammunition and explosives, which took a heavy toll on communities. The illegal exploitation of natural resources and poaching, particularly in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan, also continued to fuel conflict, destroying the environment and devastating communities.

19. Contested or delayed elections remained a threat to peace and security. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the postponement of elections in December created a highly volatile political situation, leading to renewed violence in the country. In the Republic of the Congo, political tensions persisted following the presidential elections in March 2016, while opposition presidential candidates remained under arrest pending trial or had their movements restricted. In Gabon, tensions between the Government and key opposition parties remained despite the conclusion of a political dialogue in May 2017. A number of countries started constitutional reform processes that were divisive and in some cases triggered violence.

20. Furthermore, the dramatic fall in the prices of commodities, in particular oil, continued to inject an incendiary element into political and social tensions in such countries as Chad, Gabon, Nigeria and the Republic of the Congo.

Partnership in conflict prevention and peacemaking

21. In this context, shifting the focus from managing to preventing conflict is my priority and that of the African Union Commission Chairperson as well. Member States of both organizations have repeatedly called for renewed efforts to prevent conflict before its outbreak and to sustain peace, including through the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union's Agenda 2063 and Silencing the Guns by 2020 initiatives. Despite some positive developments in this area, much work remains to be done.

22. During the reporting period, the United Nations and the African Union continued to strengthen their collaboration in conflict prevention and peacemaking. Following the provision by the Department of Political Affairs and UNOAU of technical advice during the design phase, the African Union Commission announced in September the establishment of a Mediation Support Unit within its Peace and Security Department. The United Nations continued to engage with the Unit to determine areas of additional support and capacity requirements, including in the areas of training, knowledge management and mediation facilitation.

23. With a view to advancing the women, peace and security agenda, on 2 June, UN-Women, the African Union Commission and Germany launched the African Women Leaders Network. The launch took place following the High-level Women Leaders Forum for Africa's Transformation, held at United Nations Headquarters from 31 May to 2 June. The Network aims to enhance women's leadership in the transformation of Africa, with a focus on governance, peace and stability.

24. From 19 to 28 July, a joint United Nations-African Union delegation visited Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. During the visit, the Deputy

Secretary-General, the African Union Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security, the Under-Secretary-General/Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and my Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict met with senior officials and civil society groups and helped to raise awareness on gender, including gender equality and the importance of women's participation and leadership in electoral and peace processes.

25. Electoral observation and assistance remained a key area of cooperation with the African Union. The Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs maintained a senior electoral expert in Addis Ababa to support the United Nations and the African Union on electoral matters. In addition, in June, a representative of the African Union Commission participated in a training programme on preventing and responding to electoral violence, organized in Jordan by the Division and the United Nations System Staff College. In March, an African Union representative, along with representatives of other regional organizations, participated in a workshop in Cairo on electoral needs assessments and the use of technology in elections organized by the United Nations and the League of Arab States.

26. From 16 to 19 May, the United Nations, the African Union and ECOWAS, along with the European Union, undertook a joint mission to the Gambia to support security sector reform efforts. From 13 to 19 May, the African Union undertook a needs assessment mission to the Gambia, at the request of the Peace and Security Council, to look into ongoing economic reforms and efforts towards national reconciliation. The fifty-first ordinary session of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, held on 4 June, decided to establish the International Contact Group on the Gambia.

27. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, with the political and technical support of the United Nations, the African Union Facilitator for the national dialogue in the country facilitated efforts that resulted in the signing, on 18 October, of a political agreement between the ruling majority and part of the opposition. Ultimately, the Episcopal Conference of the Democratic Republic of the Congo brokered a comprehensive political agreement on 31 December, with the support of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the African Union and the United Nations.

28. However, notwithstanding the welcoming of the collaboration between the United Nations and the African Union, concern about the slow progress in the implementation of the agreement, as well as the escalating violence and the spread of insecurity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was expressed at a joint briefing of the Peace and Security Council on 27 March, attended by my Deputy Special Representative and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission and Head of the African Union Liaison Office in the country.

29. The Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan continued its effective collaboration with the African Union on peacemaking. This included working with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel on efforts to implement Security Council resolution 2046 (2012). In January, on the margins of the African Union Summit, the United Nations convened a joint consultative meeting with IGAD and the African Union on South Sudan. The Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan has worked closely with Alpha Oumar Konaré, the former President of Mali, in his capacity as the African Union's High Representative for South Sudan, to determine ways in which the United Nations, the African Union and IGAD can resuscitate the South Sudan political

process, and, where appropriate, support nationally driven efforts such as the national dialogue that have the potential to create transformative change in a country beset by violence and profound political divisions.

30. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission visited South Sudan and reinforced our collaborative efforts, reiterating that the African Union would further engage IGAD and the United Nations on the deteriorating security situation in the country. The Security Council reaffirmed the call for trilateral collaboration at its meeting on South Sudan in March. In cooperation with other entities, the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan has actively engaged in the quest to find a regionally supported political solution following the collapse of the 2015 peace agreement,

31. Cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union on the crisis in Libya continued. The United Nations supported the visits to the country by the African Union's High Representative for Libya and the ministerial delegation of the African Union High-level Committee on Libya in May and June. My new Special Representative for Libya looks forward to further strengthening the close working relations with regional organizations, including the African Union, amid growing recognition among international and regional partners of the need for greater cooperation and coordination in advancing the political process in the country.

Partnership in peacekeeping

32. The current security context on the African continent necessitates creative and strategic thinking about a range of peace operations so as to enable an adequate international response to conflict.

33. During the reporting period, the United Nations and the African Union further strengthened collaboration on Somalia at both the strategic and operational levels. The Chairperson of African Union Commission and I visited Mogadishu in the early days of our respective tenures. On 11 May, the Federal Government of Somalia, the United Nations, the African Union and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland co-chaired the London Somalia Conference at which the parties endorsed a new partnership for Somalia and a security pact, laying out the mutual commitments of the Somali Government and international partners. It also underscored the importance of a conditions-based transition of security from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to Somali forces. At the operational level, UNOAU remained actively engaged with the African Union, supporting AMISOM by providing technical advice for deployment and strategic management.

34. The collaboration between the two organizations has been focused in particular on AMISOM, with the continuing roll-out of the Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis and Response Cell and other measures and mechanisms to prevent violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The joint review of AMISOM led to several concrete recommendations to strengthen those measures, including the human rights due diligence policy. I wish to emphasize that, in increasingly high-risk environments such as that in Somalia, progress on this compliance framework is a priority of the United Nations-African Union partnership.

35. A joint review of AMISOM, which was undertaken in May pursuant to Security Council resolution 2297 (2016), culminated in recommendations in which the parties reiterated the importance of a conditions-based transition and underscored the need to ensure predictable financing for African Union forces. A transition strategy for the period from 2017 to 2022 was also recommended, and new accountability measures were introduced with a view to enhancing the capacity

of AMISOM to ensure civilian protection and compliance with human rights and international humanitarian law.

36. In the Lake Chad basin region, the United Nations, the African Union and other international partners supported the efforts of the multinational joint task force to combat Boko Haram. On 24 February, the support implementation agreement and the memorandum of understanding between the African Union Commission and the relevant countries contributing troops to the task force, aimed at streamlining additional African Union support to the task force, were signed.

37. Pursuant to resolution 2349 (2017), the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel continued to conduct joint visits to countries affected by Boko Haram to assess the situation and advocate for additional support from the international community for the efforts of Lake Chad Basin Commission member States. United Nations humanitarian entities also worked with national authorities to meet the immediate needs of affected civilians.

38. In Central Africa, the United Nations and the African Union worked closely in support of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). In cooperation with the African Union, UNOCA, on 15 and 16 December, facilitated a meeting to review the implementation of the United Nations regional strategy to address the threat and impact of the activities of LRA and its implementation plan and to enhance coordination among bilateral partners, civil society groups, non-governmental organizations and United Nations entities working in LRA-affected areas. UNOCA will work with partners in the region, including the African Union, to revise the regional strategy in the light of the withdrawal of Ugandan and South Sudanese troops from the African Union regional task force and the end of the United States Special Forces' mandate to support the task force. Furthermore, UNOAU in December supported the African Union in the planning and revision of the strategic concept of operations of the Regional Cooperation Initiative, as well as in the drafting of the report of experts on the meeting of the joint coordination mechanism of the Initiative, held at the ministerial level in March. Joint planning and management played an important role in ensuring the complementarity of efforts on the ground and alignment between the United Nations and the African Union.

39. In Mali and the Sahel, terrorism and violent extremism continued to pose a significant threat to peace and security. On 13 April, the Peace and Security Council endorsed the strategic concept of operations and authorized the deployment of the joint force of the Group of Five for the Sahel States (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and the Niger) for an initial period of 12 months and with a strength of up to 5,000 personnel. On 21 June, the Security Council, in its resolution 2359 (2017), welcomed the deployment of the joint force. It is important that those efforts complement peace efforts in Mali and be coordinated with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali, the African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, Operation Barkhane, led by France, and related initiatives of such organizations as ECOWAS and those carried out in the framework of the Nouakchott Process, including those addressing the root causes of conflict in Mali and the broader Sahel region.

40. In the Sudan, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) underwent a joint strategic review, from 5 to 17 March, which brought important changes to the mission in the light of the improvement of security in Darfur and political developments with respect to the national dialogue in the Sudan. Subsequently, the Peace and Security Council, in a communiqué of 12 June, and the Security Council, in its resolution 2363 (2017) of 29 June, agreed that UNAMID

should implement a two-pronged approach focusing, in the Jebel Marra, on peacekeeping, military protection, clearance of explosive remnants of war and emergency relief and, in other areas of Darfur, on a peacebuilding-oriented approach aimed at stabilizing the situation by supporting the police and helping to build rule of law institutions while continuing to protect civilians and mediating intercommunal conflict. Within this framework, by June 2018, the mission will have reduced its military component by 44 per cent and its police component by 27 per cent.

41. At the same time, the United Nations worked closely with the African Union and the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms to strengthen the operational readiness of the African Standby Force. For the continent, the operationalization of the Force is a positive development that provides significant opportunities. In January 2016, the African Union Specialized Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security declared the full operational capability of the Force, and in October the African Union Commission developed the Maputo strategic five-year workplan (2016-2020) to support efforts to address the remaining challenges. Since then, collaboration between the two bodies has focused on the further strengthening of strategic guidance, military, police and civilian capabilities and mission support systems in line with the Maputo workplan. From 31 July to 2 August, a team from the African Union Commission visited the SADC secretariat to verify, confirm and validate the operational readiness of the SADC Standby Force. The United Nations participated as an observer.

42. There has also been commendable progress in the cooperation of the two bodies on international human rights law and international humanitarian law in peace support operations. In July 2016, African Heads of State and Government agreed to develop a comprehensive human rights and code of conduct compliance framework as part of the effort to reinvigorate the African Union Peace Fund. Subsequent to that decision, UNOAU and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) worked closely with the African Union Commission to develop strategic guidance to strengthen adherence to international human rights law and international humanitarian law. UNOAU and OHCHR also continued to support the strengthening of human rights mechanisms in ongoing missions through training, planning, monitoring and reporting.

Partnership in peacebuilding and the rule of law

43. The African Union is an important partner of the United Nations in peacebuilding and the rule of law, and as such is uniquely positioned to generate consensus on continental policies and foster regional and national ownership. Despite numerous challenges with regard to peacebuilding efforts, Africa has witnessed incremental progress in promoting security and stability.

44. During the reporting period, the Peacebuilding Fund continued to support 18 countries in Africa. It quickly delivered flexible funding to help prevent relapses into conflict and sustain peace, including in Burundi, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone, all of which are on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission. In addition, until February, the Peacebuilding Fund provided direct financial support to the African Union Commission to help sustain the deployment of human rights observers to Burundi, marking the first time the Fund has provided support through a regional organization. In October, the Chairs of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support visited the African Union Commission to explore ways to further enhance cooperation, in the context of the African Union post-conflict reconstruction and development policy framework adopted in 2006, as well as the African Solidarity Initiative.

45. Meanwhile, the African Union and the United Nations cooperated closely in the key areas of rule of law and security institutions towards the implementation of African Union Master Road Map of Practical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020. On disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, the United Nations, through UNOAU and the World Bank, supported the African Union in the development of the second phase of its disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme aimed at enhancing knowledge management and training standards. During the reporting period, the United Nations contributed to the development of seven African Union disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operational guidance notes, on children, detention, women, national frameworks, reintegration, countering violent extremism, and foreign fighters. The United Nations also contributed to the African Union's project on managing and accounting for illicit small arms and light weapons. Furthermore, in coordination with the European Union, the United Nations, through a capacity-building programme, supported the African Union Commission in the implementation of a security sector reform policy. At the operational level, joint assessments were conducted in the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau.

46. The United Nations and the African Union strengthened their partnership in mine action through the adoption, in June, of a memorandum of understanding by the African Union Commission and the Mine Action Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In this context, UNOAU, in cooperation with the Mine Action Service, provided technical guidance and support for the implementation of the African Union Mine Action and Explosive Remnants of War Strategic Framework for 2014-2017 and for the development of a joint African Union-United Nations safety handbook on landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices for use by African Union peace support operations.

47. United Nations and African Union police continued their cooperation with a focus on police planning, guidance, tackling of serious and organized crime, and conduct and discipline. UNOAU provided technical support for the development of the African Union policy on international policing, which was ratified at the second Conference of the African Union Police Strategic Support Group, held from 28 November to 2 December in Addis Ababa. The Group is mandated to harmonize police action across all African Union peace support operations. On 20 April, UNOAU facilitated the first consultative meeting of seven countries contributing police to AMISOM, held in Addis Ababa. The meeting served as a forum for the exchange of views on institutional capacity-building efforts for the Somali police force and the integration in police units of quotas for women and gender mainstreaming.

IV. Financing of African Union peace support operations

48. The necessity of sustained, predictable and flexible funding mechanisms to support African Union peace support operations has been discussed by the legislative bodies of the two organizations for more than a decade. The issue has become more critical in the past two years, following the conclusions of the 2015 High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations and the decrease in voluntary contributions by the European Union to AMISOM, which have led to a 20 per cent reduction in troop stipends.

49. Since taking office, I, along with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, have consistently stressed the need to ensure that African Union peace support operations authorized by the Security Council secure sustainable and predictable funding. The African Union has taken important steps to that end since

2015, including through the commitment that its member States finance 25 per cent of its peace support operations, as well as the decision to introduce a 0.2 per cent levy on eligible imports to finance the African Union Peace Fund.

50. I welcome the significant work undertaken collaboratively by our two organizations on this critical issue, as well as the reports of the Chairperson of the Commission on the African Union Peace Fund and on the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 2320 (2016) on United Nations assessed contributions for African Union-led peace operations authorized by the Council. I take particular note of the African Union's priorities for strengthening the overall effectiveness, management and oversight of peace support operations, which include securing predictable financing within the framework of the Peace Fund, strengthening planning and management capacities, strengthening the partnership with the United Nations and establishing a robust accountability and compliance framework.

51. Partners such as the United Nations can also help to shoulder the financial burden, and in my recent report on options for authorization and support for African Union peace support operations (S/2017/454), I presented some options by which United Nations assessed contributions can be used to support such operations.

52. The report also includes proposals for institutionalized approaches to joint planning and mandating of African Union peace support operations. Different situations will require different planning, financing and support arrangements, but these should be underpinned by jointly agreed principles and decision-making processes. Those processes are intended to complement ongoing efforts within the African Union Commission to establish and strengthen internal accountability mechanisms.

53. On 30 May, during its consideration of the report of the African Union Commission Chairperson on the relevant provisions of Security Council resolution 2320 (2016), the Peace and Security Council reiterated its commitment to the partnership with the United Nations, reaffirmed the principle of African ownership and appealed to its member States to expedite the payment of their annual contributions to the Peace Fund, while calling for a resolution establishing the principle that peace support operations mandated or authorized by the African Union should benefit from United Nations assessed contributions, with decisions on specific missions to be taken on a case-by-case basis. Members of the Security Council, on 15 June and 19 July, highlighted the need to continue the joint work towards supporting Member States in finding a common approach to the perennial issue of securing predictable and sustainable financial support for African Union operations, including on the basis of the proposals of the African Union High Representative for the Peace Fund, who addressed the Council.

V. Partnership with regional organizations and arrangements

Regional economic communities and regional mechanisms

54. It is increasingly important to strengthen the partnership between the United Nations, the African Union and the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms in order to effectively confront peace and security challenges in Africa. African subregional organizations are important partners in a number of areas, including good offices, support for peace negotiations, ceasefire agreements and regional intervention forces. They play a critical role in helping to facilitate complex and fragile peace processes by fostering political will. They are partners of the United Nations on countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism, regional policing strategies and addressing migration, as well as on the development

and the implementation of regional action plans to advance the women, peace and security agenda.

55. During the past year, regional economic communities and regional mechanisms have played an important role in conflict prevention and mediation. For example, ECOWAS has continued to lead good offices efforts and mediation support in the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. The East African Community continued to lead international interventions in Burundi, while ECCAS led in the Central African Republic. SADC took active measures to ensure that the results of the early elections held in Lesotho in June would be accepted by all stakeholders. High-level engagement to monitor the situation during the electoral campaign, on the part of the SADC Lesotho facilitator, the Deputy President of South Africa and the SADC Oversight Committee on Lesotho, contributed to a peaceful and fair electoral outcome.

56. IGAD played a key role in the conflict-resolution process in South Sudan and made a significant contribution to the formation of federal states in Somalia. Furthermore, in March, the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government adopted the Nairobi Declaration on Durable Solutions for Somali Refugees and Reintegration of Returnees in Somalia, which contained commitments on protection and measures to create an environment conducive to the voluntary return and reintegration of Somali refugees, supported by the international community.

57. Likewise, in Central and West Africa, regional coalitions of the willing continued to be indispensable in confronting violent extremism, as demonstrated in the leading role played by the Lake Chad Basin Commission and Benin in addressing the challenges posed by Boko Haram, the efforts of the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of LRA and the renewed attempts by the members of the Group of Five for the Sahel States to grapple with violent extremism in northern Mali and the broader Sahel.

Other regional organizations and arrangements

58. Cooperation between the United Nations, the African Union and other regional organizations continues to be a priority. The effectiveness of the United Nations rests in large measure on our cooperation with those organizations. Pooling resources on the basis of the principle of comparative advantage and jointly pursuing a common approach has proven both necessary and efficient.

59. The situation in Libya provides one example of the increasing level of cooperation among regional organizations. The United Nations, the African Union and the League of Arab States, on 25 October, inaugurated a group known as the Troika with the objective of enhancing cooperation and coordination to encourage national reconciliation and the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement. On 18 March, the Troika welcomed the participation of the European Union in the forum, which was thenceforth known as the Quartet. On 23 May, the Quartet reiterated its collective commitment to advancing the United Nations-facilitated political process towards resolving the crisis in Libya. The ongoing engagement increased confidence among the four organizations, allowing them to harmonize their positions and to utilize their comparative advantage with a view to working together to further a common agenda.

60. The numerous cases of simultaneous United Nations, African Union and European Union engagements in Africa demonstrate that the three organizations are able to contribute the necessary skills and find solutions to crises and post-conflict situations based on the principles of comparative advantage, added value and burden-sharing. On 5 July, on the margins of the African Union Summit, my Special

Representative to the African Union attended a meeting of executives and senior officials of the African Union, regional economic communities, regional mechanisms and the European Union on peace and security. The meeting was focused on strengthening political and strategic dialogue and on mobilizing international support to that end, with a view to identifying recommendations for consideration by the Africa-European Union Summit, to be held in Abidjan in November. The establishment of a collaborative platform on peace and security in Africa bringing together the United Nations, the African Union and the European Union to strengthen political and strategic dialogue was mentioned as a possible outcome of the upcoming Summit.

VI. United Nations Office to the African Union

Strengthening the strategic and operational partnership

61. During the reporting period, UNOAU continued to work closely with the African Union to strengthen complementarity and unity of action. The Office is a key conduit for enhancing strategic and operational partnership with the African Union, providing substantive and technical support and facilitating convergence in decision-making, including between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council. The Office provided 29 briefings to the Peace and Security Council and facilitated 8 briefings by senior United Nations representatives to promote a common understanding on conflict situations and to develop collaborative approaches. Furthermore, since the previous report, UNOAU has provided five country-specific or thematic briefings for representatives of States members of the Security Council resident in Addis Ababa. The Office played a vital role in developing the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework on Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security and in the preparations for the first United Nations-African Union annual conference, the regular meetings of the joint task force and desk-to-desk meetings. UNOAU supported the preparations for and the conduct of the joint African Union-United Nations review of AMISOM. In addition, UNOAU provided secretariat and logistical support for visits by the Security Council and the Peacebuilding Commission to Addis Ababa.

62. UNOAU also supported the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the African Union to plan and manage its peace support operations, from policy development to force preparation. The initial work in aligning policies standards and practices will form the basis for strengthened cooperation between the two organizations in peace support operations and mission transitions. UNOAU will continue to play an important role in coordinating United Nations support for the implementation of the Maputo strategic five-year workplan (2016-2020) to strengthen the African Standby Force, manage conflicts on the continent and strengthen coordination and information-sharing between the United Nations and the African Union.

Restructuring the Office to meet the growing demands of the partnership

63. In its resolution 71/270, the General Assembly approved the proposal of the Secretary-General to restructure UNOAU so as to strengthen strategic coherence with the African Union and the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms throughout the conflict cycle. In its resolution 2320 (2016), the Security Council recognized that further realignment might be necessary as a result of the assessment of United Nations-African Union cooperation, including the

structure and resource capacity of UNOAU, to meet the growing demands of the partnership.

64. The new structure, which took effect on 1 January, enables UNOAU to contribute more effectively to efforts aimed at achieving greater political convergence and operational cohesion between the United Nations, the African Union and its partners on peace and security in Africa. The Office integrates two pillars: the Political Affairs Section and the Institutional and Operational Partnership Service. They jointly report to a newly established Deputy Head of Office. A new Office of the Chief of Staff oversees the integrated and coherent functioning of UNOAU across all areas. I intend to carry out an assessment of UNOAU, pursuant to Security Council resolution 2320 (2016), that will comprehensively evaluate the growing needs of the United Nations-African Union partnership and the capacity of UNOAU to meet the demands placed on it.

VII. Observations and recommendations

65. Stronger partnership with the African Union and the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms will enable the United Nations to respond early, swiftly, coherently and decisively to prevent conflict and effectively address challenges to peace and security. I welcome progress on the partnership made during the reporting period. The signing of the Joint United Nations-African Union Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security, the start of the operationalization of the African Union Peace Fund and the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 2320 (2016) represent solid steps towards further elevating our platform of cooperation in Africa. I commend the Chairperson of African Union Commission for his leadership and commitment in that regard, and once again reiterate my intention to continue working to further strengthen the partnership.

66. Since taking office, I have emphasized my intention to work more proactively on conflict prevention. The Chairperson of the African Union Commission has expressed the same intention. In the joint framework, both organizations committed to early engagement, to sharing early warning information and analysis with a view to reaching a common understanding of emerging or ongoing conflicts and, through consultative decision-making, to developing collaborative approaches. The Secretariat will work to strengthen its coordination with the African Union to achieve this, including through closer collaboration among special representatives and envoys. It is imperative that the progress achieved in recent years with respect to consultation and collaboration between the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council be consolidated.

67. I look forward to working with the African Union to continue to enhance our partnerships with Africa's regional economic communities and regional mechanisms. They are at the forefront of our efforts to achieve peace and security on the continent, and they are the driving force for achieving Africa's development objectives. The only way that the international community can address conflicts on the continent is in unity with the countries of the region, with the ability to serve together and according to the same universal principles. My special representatives and envoys in the African subregions will work closely with UNOAU to facilitate greater information-sharing and joint action among the United Nations, the African Union and the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms, particularly on the causes and drivers of conflict. The deeper and more consistent the collaboration, the greater the certainty of achieving the goals of the 2030 Agenda and Agenda 2063.

68. The increase in regional peacekeeping and peace support operations confirms that the demand in Africa today exceeds what the United Nations, the African Union or any other regional or subregional organization by itself can meet. While new strategic thinking on the diversity of peace operations is needed to ensure that the international community is able to respond adequately to conflict situations, the high demand confirms that peacekeeping remains indispensable, not only as a versatile tool, but also as a highly cost-effective instrument. From Somalia to Mali, from Darfur to the Central African Republic, we have accumulated a considerable degree of expertise and some unique capabilities. I pay tribute to African peacekeepers, many of whom have paid the ultimate price for contributing to the goals of the Charter of the United Nations.

69. While we are witnessing some encouraging signs of progress, our operations can succeed only if the African Union and regional economic communities and regional mechanisms continue to help create political space for political solutions to take root. The joint framework will enable us to sustain a strengthened, dynamic dialogue in order to make structural improvements to our common response efforts, based on shared assessments, joint planning exercises and concerted decisions. It is important to enhance efforts to achieve a unified political vision, as well as to agree on what it takes to implement it.

70. Enhancing African capacities in the area of peace and security requires adequate, timely and predictable financing for African Union peace support operations. During the reporting period, African Union member States have taken important steps towards greater self-reliance and burden-sharing. I applaud this progress and the African Union's continuing commitment to covering 25 per cent of the cost of its peace support operations, as well as the significant work undertaken by the two organizations on the report on the joint review of available mechanisms to finance and support African Union peace support operations authorized by the Security Council (A/71/410-S/2016/809), the report of the Secretary-General on options for authorization and support for African Union peace support operations (S/2017/454) and the report of the African Union on the relevant provisions of Council resolution 2320 (2016) on United Nations assessed contributions for African Union-led peace operations authorized by the Council.

71. I recognize that the implementation of African Union decisions on the financing of the Union and its Peace Fund will require strong leadership and commitment. However, the continued support and encouragement of the Security Council, particularly on the issue of predictable and sustainable financing of peace support operations authorized by the Council, is needed to help translate words into action. Such support would reinforce the Council's primary responsibility, under the Charter of the United Nations, for the maintenance of international peace and security, while also recognizing the important role of regional organizations consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter.

72. Effective African capacity for peacekeeping is increasingly important, both in the context of our collective response to international peace and security challenges and for stability on the African continent. The determination of the African Union and African countries is real and encouraging, including with regard to the further development of accountability frameworks. Our reports have highlighted the importance of compliance and oversight of African Union peace support operations through robust and effective human rights mechanisms and a conduct and discipline framework. The United Nations will continue to work closely with the African Union to build predictable approaches to the partnership, including on the planning of peace operations, as well as on issues related to budget and finance, audit and accountability, human rights compliance, and conduct and discipline, with a view to strengthening complementarity of efforts.

73. In furthering this spirit of cooperation and recognizing the principle of comparative advantage, the United Nations is committed to looking at response mechanisms in a more integrated fashion and working towards an interlocking system of capabilities that is flexible, working across and between regions, particularly through the African Standby Force and its rapid deployment capability. It is in the interest of the United Nations to continue to support the enhancement of African Union capacities in conflict prevention and management but not to defer responsibility for conflict in Africa, aiming at strengthening the collective security system. Close cooperation among the United Nations, the African Union and other key partners, such as the European Union, is critical for achieving those objectives. To that end, I look forward to exploring the possibility of establishing trilateral collaborative mechanisms.

74. I am committed to strengthening our cooperation and partnership on the basis of the priorities and needs of the people of Africa. We shall continue to work together to create the conditions necessary for the African continent to fully meet the aspirations of its people, especially its youth.

75. As outlined herein, UNOAU continues to play a pivotal role as the first port of entry to the United Nations for the African Union in our growing partnership. The day-to-day engagements between UNOAU and African Union officials are the building blocks in our efforts to share views and analyses, seek common ground on issues of concern and undertake joint action to address them. UNOAU plays an important role, one that I will continue to review and strengthen in line with the demands of the partnership.

76. Africa's needs remain significant, but so are the contributions that Africa has made to further unity, peace and progress for all people on the continent. We need to fully integrate African success stories into our United Nations narrative. I acknowledge and value with humility the contribution and sacrifice made by so many African countries to the United Nations around the world and to peace operations in Africa. I would like to pay tribute to the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Moussa Faki Mahamat, for his leadership and his commitment to the management reform process. I also wish to express my appreciation to the African Union, its member States and the regional economic communities and regional mechanisms for their continued cooperation with the United Nations in efforts to address challenges to peace and security in Africa. I also wish to express my appreciation to my Special Representative to the African Union, as well as the staff of UNOAU and that of all United Nations and African Union entities serving to advance peace, security and development in the region.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2366 (2017), in which the Council requested that, within 45 days of the adoption of the resolution, I present detailed recommendations regarding the size, operational aspects and mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, consistent with the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP) (see S/2017/272, annex II). It also follows my report to the Council on the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia, dated 23 June 2017 (S/2017/539).

II. Mandate

2. The Final Agreement, which was signed on 24 November 2016, provided for the establishment of a second special political mission that would begin operations upon completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia, which was given responsibility for the verification of the Agreement between the Government and FARC-EP on the Bilateral and Definitive Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities and Laying Down of Arms (Ceasefire Agreement). Section 6.3.3 of the Final Agreement specifies that the second United Nations mission should be responsible for the verification of the reintegration of FARC-EP members into political, economic and social life; the implementation of personal and collective security and protection measures; and comprehensive security and protection programmes for communities and organizations in the territories.

3. On 5 June 2017, in identical letters addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, the President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos Calderon, formally requested, on behalf of the Government and FARC-EP, the establishment of the second mission by 10 July 2017 (see S/2017/481, annex). In his letter, the President emphasized that the support of the international community, in particular through the United Nations Mission in Colombia, had been instrumental in ensuring full compliance with the Ceasefire Agreement. The letters outlined the proposed mandate for the second mission in accordance with section 6.3.3 of the Final Agreement. It also requested that the second mission operate for a period of three years, renewable if necessary, and specified that the mission would be of a political nature and encompass both regional and local verification.

4. On 9 June 2017, in a letter addressed to me, the President of the Security Council requested that I provide the Council with initial recommendations for the establishment of the second political mission. In response, in my report to the Council of 23 June (S/2017/539), I recommended that the Council respond favourably to the parties' request. I also specified that the ability of the United Nations to meet the parties' request would be facilitated if the Council authorized me to initiate preparations for the second mission immediately. With that authority, I would undertake an integrated planning process for the second mission and present detailed proposals regarding the mission's functions, size, structure and operational aspects, informed by practical experience on the ground. I also noted that, until such time as the second mission could be fully established, the United Nations Mission in Colombia was in a position, if so authorized by the Council, to initiate some tasks of the second mandate on a provisional basis, within available resources and from its current 9 regional and 26 local headquarters, pending further assessment to determine the requirements for full implementation.

5. On 10 July 2017, by its resolution 2366 (2017), the Security Council established the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (the Verification Mission) for an initial period of 12 months and decided that it should begin all verification activities on 26 September, immediately after completion of the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Colombia. The resolution specifies that the Verification Mission should verify implementation by the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP of sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement, including the political, economic and social reintegration of FARC-EP and the implementation of personal and collective security guarantees and of comprehensive programmes on security and protection measures for communities and organizations in the territories, as well as carrying out the required regional and local verification. In the resolution, the Council requested that I report to it every 90 days on the implementation of the mandate of the Verification Mission. The Council also directed the United Nations Mission in Colombia to begin provisional work anticipated by the Verification Mission, as set out in my report of 23 June, within its current configuration and capacity.

III. Mission tasks

6. The tasks for the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia will be related exclusively to verification, as opposed to those of the current Mission, which included the coordination of the tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism as well as operational tasks, such as the recently concluded destruction of unstable armaments and the extraction of weapons containers, as well as the ongoing neutralization of weapons. The commitments to reintegration and security guarantees that the new Mission will be required to verify are articulated in detail in sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement.

Verification of political, economic and social reintegration

7. The new Mission will be charged with verifying commitments regarding the political and socioeconomic reintegration of FARC-EP members. Section 3.2 of the Final Agreement outlines the context and spirit in which the reintegration process must be understood:

> Laying the foundations for building a stable and lasting peace requires the effective reintegration of FARC-EP into the country's social, economic and political life. The reintegration process confirms the commitment of FARC-EP to contribute to the ending of the armed conflict, to become a legal political entity and contribute decisively to the consolidation of national reconciliation,

coexistence and guarantees of non-repetition, and to transform the conditions that allowed violence across the country to break out and persist.

8. With regard to political reintegration, the Final Agreement provides that the transition of FARC-EP from an armed organization into a new legal political party or movement, which has rights and which fulfils the obligations and duties inherent to constitutional order, is an essential condition for ending the armed conflict, building a stable and lasting peace and, in general, for strengthening democracy in Colombia. Guarantees for the new political movement or party that emerges from the transition of FARC-EP into a legal entity taking part in political life include the right to: register with and be recognized by the National Electoral Council; technical assistance, operational funding and support; assured access and funding for participation in the 2018 and 2022 elections; access to the media; and special security guarantees for the movement and its leaders. It also includes guarantees regarding political representation, on a temporary basis, for the new movement or party in the national Congress during two constitutional periods, starting in 2018, and a temporary non-voting delegate on the National Electoral Council.

9. The Final Agreement also outlines the general philosophy of the process of socioeconomic reintegration, which should be aimed at strengthening the social fabric across the country, coexistence and reconciliation among its inhabitants and developing and deploying socially productive activities and local democracy. A road map agreed to by the parties on 29 May 2017 stressed that socioeconomic reintegration should be community based. The Final Agreement also points out that the process of reintegration should have, in all its aspects, a differentiated approach, with an emphasis on the rights of women.

10. A number of commitments relating to socioeconomic reintegration have already been implemented, including the establishment of the National Reintegration Council; the legal establishment of a social and economic solidarity organization (Ecomun) for the purpose of the productive reintegration of FARC-EP; the creation of a centre for political thought and education; the transformation of the Colombian Agency for Reintegration into the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization; a presidential decree on socioeconomic reintegration; and a social and economic census of FARC-EP members. Another set of commitments are currently being implemented, including the transition to legal status of former FARC-EP fighters and militias; the reintegration of minors who have left FARC-EP camps; access to bank accounts for FARC-EP members; and training and educational activities.

11. Further economic and social reintegration measures that require verification include the identification and implementation of sustainable, socially productive projects and programmes; a fund for reintegration projects that will be set up through Ecomun; the availability of funds for individual projects; and a number of measures under the rubric of "guarantees for sustainable social and economic reintegration". The latter includes provisions for a basic income for former FARC-EP members for a period of 24 months, a normalization allowance, social security payments and social programmes. It should be noted that, for all the above activities, the Final Agreement allows for the provision of economic support from the private sector and foundations, as well as bilateral and multilateral cooperation, without prejudice to funds dedicated to those activities by the Government.

Verification of security guarantees

12. Section 3.4 of the Final Agreement comprises a broad range of measures aimed at enhancing the security of the citizens of Colombia in the aftermath of the conflict between the State and FARC-EP in a context where, notwithstanding the ceasefire, the laying down of weapons by FARC-EP and its conversion into a

peaceful political organization, illegal groups and entrenched patterns of violence continue to exist, affecting in particular the rural areas and communities that have suffered most from decades of violence. The security measures are consistent with the overall orientation of the Final Agreement, which, in order to secure lasting peace, focuses peace consolidation efforts on the stabilization of rural areas of the country, in particular in poor and extremely poor areas that were significantly impacted by the conflict, that have weak State institutions and where illicit crops are cultivated and there are other forms of illegal economic activity.

13. The security guarantees included in section 3.4 of the Final Agreement can be categorized into four broad areas: (a) the establishment of national bodies; (b) specific measures for personal and collective security, (c) a comprehensive security system for the exercise of politics, aimed especially at the political opposition; and (d) a comprehensive security and protection programme for the communities and organizations in areas most affected by the conflict.

14. At the national level, the National Commission on Security Guarantees has already been established. This body, chaired at the highest levels, has wide-ranging responsibilities associated with the planning, monitoring and cross-sector coordination of measures to dismantle organizations responsible for attacks on human rights advocates, social movements, political movements and those taking part in the implementation of the peace process. The Commission has contributed to the establishment of the legal framework for enhanced security guarantees, including a legal decree for the establishment of a special investigation unit within the Office of the Attorney General and a programme on reconciliation, coexistence and prevention of stigmatization.

15. Other relevant national bodies that have already been established include the Police Elite Corps, which will operate primarily in areas most affected by the conflict to combat criminal organizations; the Technical Committee on Security and Protection, with the participation of members of the Government and FARC-EP; the Sub-Directorate of the National Protection Unit; and the Security and Protection Corps, a body of mixed composition that includes former members of FARC-EP who have received appropriate training and equipment.

16. A number of measures related to the comprehensive security system for the exercise of politics have already been or being taken, including guarantees for the security of political parties and movements, as well as for members of the new party or movement that will emerge from the transition of FARC-EP. Pending tasks include the strengthening of the early warning system of the Office of the Ombudsman and the programmes to support reconciliation, coexistence and prevention of political stigmatization.

17. A centrepiece of the set of security guarantees is the comprehensive security and protection programme for communities and organizations, highlighted in the letter of the President of Colombia. This programme, which includes a broad range of physical protection, education and awareness-raising measures to support the groups, organizations and people most at risk, also contains specific measures for the protection and participation of women.

IV. Deployment, staffing and structure

18. On the basis of the mandate set out in resolution 2366 (2017), a number of considerations have been taken into account and consultations have been held with the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP in order to ensure the best possible design for the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. Discussions with

the Government involved entities with which the new Mission will be called upon to cooperate most closely in carrying out its mandate, in particular the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Defence, the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Office of the Attorney General, the national police and the armed forces. As part of those consultations, on 14 August 2017, my Special Representative for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Mission in Colombia sent a letter outlining the concept that would guide verification, dispute resolution and confidence-building for the new Mission to the members of the Commission for Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement, the National Reintegration Council and the National Commission for Security Guarantees, the three entities identified as key interlocutors in resolution 2366 (2017). The current Mission has also taken stock of the practical experience gained since 10 July with the initial verification of reintegration and security guarantees within its current configuration and capacity. In addition, an integrated planning process between the current Mission and the United Nations country team has been carried out with a view to maximizing synergies and avoiding duplication in the implementation of their respective mandates. Based on these considerations, I am in a position to make the following recommendations on the size and operational aspects of the Verification Mission.

A. Geographical deployment

19. In keeping with the need for verification to be local and regional, as requested in the letter of the President of Colombia (S/2017/481, annex) and in resolution 2366 (2017), and to design the most effective deployment for the Verification Mission, I have considered the lessons learned from the challenges encountered during the deployment of the current Mission as well as the following parameters:

(a) The need to retain a presence in or near the 26 territorial areas for training and reintegration, which were fully established as agreed by the parties on 15 August 2017, where the members of FARC-EP are in the process of reintegration and where guarantees are being provided for their security. With regard to the latter, the Government has already determined the combination of police and military forces required to ensure the protection of the territorial areas for training and reintegration, depending on the degree of risk present in each area. This arrangement will also provide the security environment needed for the activities of the Verification Mission;

(b) The need to establish a presence in locations that have been designated as priorities for the provision of security and protection of communities, in view of the risk factors present in those areas. They encompass some 170 municipalities, which the national police and the armed forces have identified in their respective stabilization plans, the Institutional Strategic Plan: Safe and Peaceful Communities 2015-2018 and the Strategic Military Plan for Stabilization and Consolidation "Victory". The deployments will accompany the Government's overall peace consolidation programme, which includes a broader presence of civilian institutions, the provision of basic goods and services, rural development initiatives and illicit crop substitution programmes. Many of those municipalities can be accessed by verification teams operating from the 26 territorial areas for training and reintegration mentioned above, as well as from the 9 regional offices where the tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism is currently deployed. However, additional small sub-offices will need to be established to ensure that the new Mission can engage with the most vulnerable communities and liaise effectively with the military and police units responsible for protection in those areas;

(c) The need to ensure, to the greatest extent possible, co-location between the new Mission and the United Nations country team, so as to maximize collaboration between the Mission and the United Nations entities in Colombia;

(d) The need to redeploy the staff of several regional offices, whose locations do not allow them to provide the best possible support to local verification activities.

20. Based on these considerations, the new Mission would retain essentially the same geographical deployment as the current Mission, namely, 1 Mission headquarters office in Bogota, 9 regional offices and 26 local teams, with the latter coinciding with the territorial areas for training and reintegration with the following modifications: (a) the Bucaramanga regional office would be transferred to Cúcuta (department of Norte de Santander), where it would be better placed to support local teams in the area, and where United Nations entities are also present; (b) a new regional office would be established in Pasto (department of Nariño) given that the current Popayán regional office is unable, owing to distance, to adequately support the local teams in Nariño, and given that United Nations entities are also present in Pasto; and (c) the establishment of small sub-offices at seven locations: Montería (department of Córdoba); Puerto Rico (department of Meta); Arauca (department of Arauca); Mocoa (department of Putumayo); Apartadó (department of Antioquia); Buenaventura (department of Valle del Cauca); and Barrancabermeja (department of Santander). This geographical deployment would enable the new Mission to cover the priority areas for the implementation of its mandate in relation to reintegration and security guarantees. It would also allow for co-location of and close coordination among the Verification Mission and 9 of the 13 local coordination teams deployed by the United Nations country team in Colombia.

B. Staffing

21. The majority of the staff of the Verification Mission will be civilians, working in teams with unarmed, non-uniformed international observers. The presence of combined teams at the local, regional and national levels will provide the Mission with the set of skills and knowledge necessary to address both the security and non-security matters pertaining to its mandate and to engage effectively with its civilian, military and police counterparts. To the extent possible, civilian staff and observers will transfer from the current Mission to the Verification Mission, in order to give the latter the benefit of in-depth experience with the peace process and the opportunity to maintain and build upon well-established professional relationships. The Verification Mission will seek to employ suitably experienced national staff in as many roles as possible, given the availability of highly qualified Colombians in the functional and thematic areas covered.

22. Local teams in the territorial areas for training and reintegration and sub-offices will be small and composed of United Nations civilian personnel and observers with a balance of military and police expertise. The core staff of the regional offices will be larger, consisting of United Nations civilian staff and observers, providing verification, public information, liaison, mission support and security capabilities. Depending on the region, the regional offices will have additional small teams, identical to the local teams in the territorial areas for training and reintegration, which will be able to travel, as required, to areas without a permanent presence where reintegration and security and protection programmes for the communities and organizations are being implemented.

C. Structure

23. The Verification Mission will be led by my Special Representative for Colombia and Head of the United Nations Mission in Colombia, who will exercise full political and operational responsibility for the Mission. In order to enable the Mission to effectively fulfil its mandate, my Special Representative will be assisted by a Deputy Special Representative, whose primary role will be to supervise the Mission's field presence, and a Chief of Staff, whose role will be to ensure that the Mission's headquarters, in Bogota, functions in an efficient and coordinated manner.

24. The Office of the Special Representative will be composed of a Senior Military Adviser and a Senior Police Adviser, a public information office, a legal affairs section, an analysis and reporting unit (including a fusion cell where information from the various components will be processed) and an operations and planning section.

25. The Verification Mission will have four components, following a structure similar to that of the current Mission: a verification component, a mission support component, a field coordination component and a security component. The verification, mission support and security components will report to the Special Representative. The field coordination component will report to the Deputy Special Representative, whose office will also include a conduct and discipline team and a training unit.

Verification component

26. The verification component will: (a) collect and process observations carried out by the teams deployed at the local, sub-office and regional levels; (b) engage with the two parties, as required, based on the results of verification, in particular with those national agencies responsible for security guarantees and reintegration; (c) prepare inputs for my reports to the Security Council; and (d) work closely with the Commission for Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement, the National Reintegration Council and the National Commission for Security Guarantees, as requested by the Security Council and the parties. The interaction with these bodies will be focused on sharing information gathered in the process of verification, discussing the assessment by the Verification Mission of progress with regard to reintegration and security guarantees, and formulating observations and recommendations as required.

27. The two sections within the verification component, one focused on reintegration and the other on security guarantees, will each be composed of a small team with expertise in the respective subject matter. A small group of advisers with expertise in gender issues, child protection, ethnic issues and other cross-cutting themes will support both verification sections. These advisers will be selected in close consultation with relevant members of the United Nations country team and will constitute a key linkage with the relevant United Nations entities, with a view to enhancing coordination.

Field coordination component

28. As amply demonstrated by the experience of the current Mission, the Verification Mission will require very close substantive, operational, logistical and security coordination at the national, regional and local levels. Doing so will continue to be a significant management challenge owing to the number and remoteness of locations in which the new Mission will operate.

29. In order to ensure effective coordination and synchronized implementation across the country, the Verification Mission will put in place a robust field coordination structure. Uninterrupted information flow and timely feedback from Mission headquarters and across regional offices will be of particular importance for the purpose of verification. The field coordination component, under the leadership of the Deputy Special Representative, will be in permanent contact with the heads of the regional offices to monitor the situation at the regional and local levels and ensure that issues of concern are raised quickly with senior Mission leadership and responded to in a timely and effective manner, and that the verification, mission support and security sides of the Mission work seamlessly in support of the Mission's operations in the field. The leadership of the field coordination component will travel extensively throughout the country to ensure regular engagement with Mission staff and regional and local authorities. The field coordination component will be in a position to identify trends across the Mission's field presence, implement solutions and ensure that best practices from different locations are shared across the Mission. Importantly, the field coordination component will oversee a 24-hour "operations room" to monitor and track all the Mission's field activities and ensure that the Mission responds immediately and in a unified and coordinated manner to emerging situations.

Mission support component

30. Since the Verification Mission will be solely responsible for the provision of the full range of support services to all its locations and personnel, a task that, with respect to the current Mission, has been shared with the Government of Colombia, a significant shift in the mission support approach will be required. Moreover, the logistical complexity of supporting verification activities over long distances and in inhospitable terrain will only increase as the new Mission expands its presence to new areas of the country.

31. Wherever possible, the Verification Mission will build upon existing contracts and agreements, adapting them where necessary, or will seek rapidly implementable "turnkey" solutions to meet its support needs. The current Mission is already in the process of undertaking detailed cost-benefit analyses of the most efficient modalities for ground and air transportation. Regarding the latter, the new Mission will maintain the current internationally provided aviation capabilities in the short term while working closely with national and regional aviation authorities and providers to fulfil United Nations certification requirements, allowing a transition from a dedicated to a stand-by aviation capability during the current mandate period.

32. The current Mission is already working closely with United Nations entities on operational and logistical aspects. To the extent possible, the Verification Mission will co-locate with members of the United Nations country team to maximize cost efficiencies and benefit from enhanced coordination through co-location. At the local level, the current Mission has and will continue to work closely with both the Government and FARC-EP to ensure that the local sites of the new Mission will be in close proximity to areas where verification will be required and be deployed in a manner that is aligned with the logistical and security deployment plans of the Government. At local sites, emphasis will be on the immediacy of service provision, acceptance by local communities, cost, sustainability and environmental impact. In this latter respect, the mission support component will have staff devoted to ensuring that the new Mission operates in an environmentally sustainable manner, in accordance with the "Greening the Blue" initiative.

Security component

33. The Government of Colombia has overall responsibility for the safety and security of all United Nations personnel in Colombia. Working closely with the national police and associated security agencies, the Department of Safety and Security will put in place a system that balances the requirement to effectively implement the mandate of the Verification Mission with the need to do so in a safe and secure manner.

34. In order to improve service, operational and financial efficiency, the United Nations security management system in Colombia will operate in a unified manner, with a single structure responsible for safety and security services to both the Verification Mission and the United Nations country team. This approach will enable the Mission to benefit from support in areas such as security analysis and assessments, investigations, 24-hour radio contact, access control, training, staff tracking, fire safety, stress counselling and security advice.

35. At the national level, the Chief Security Adviser will act as the principal security adviser to the designated official and as the Chief Security Officer of the Verification Mission, directly supporting the Special Representative in the provision of security support and advice. The Mission will deploy security staff at the regional level and appoint security focal points at the local level. Those staff members will support the provision of appropriate safety and security measures in the Mission's field locations. Mission safety and security staff will participate in information fusion cells at the national and regional levels, working closely with the staff of the Mission and United Nations county team, and, where applicable, external partners, to produce multisource security-related analysis.

Observers

36. As outlined above, unarmed, non-uniformed international observers will serve with civilian staff in combined teams, at the local, sub-office, regional and national levels. At the regional level, the most senior observer will serve as an adviser to the head of office on police and military matters.

37. Observers will be selected on the basis of criteria designed to ensure the most effective implementation of the mandate. The criteria include prior experience with verification mandates, knowledge of the issues under verification, gender balance, regional representation and adherence to United Nations values and standards. Owing to the fact that both the national police and the armed forces will play a role in the provision of security and protection to communities, the Verification Mission will seek to select and deploy an equal number of observers from the military and police services.

38. In addition to the provision of expert advice to the Special Representative, the most senior observers in the Verification Mission, in their respective capacities as the ranking police and military officer serving with the United Nations in Colombia, will also undertake important administrative and welfare functions. A small number of observers will be employed at Mission headquarters to handle administrative and welfare functions.

39. Having a wide range of countries contribute observers to the United Nations Mission in Colombia has proved to be an asset to its effectiveness and credibility. As such, all countries contributing to the current Mission, in particular non-neighbouring countries of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, will be invited to continue to contribute observers to the Verification Mission. In order to ensure a seamless transition, countries that have contributed observers will be requested to transfer a certain number of observers from the current Mission to the new Mission.

Representation of women

40. The commitment of the current Mission to increasing the number of women serving in all functions, positions and geographical locations has been an important factor contributing to its success. The Verification Mission will maintain this commitment through the prioritized recruitment of qualified female applicants and close engagement with countries that contribute observers to encourage the nomination of female observers. Indeed, the need to ensure a high level of female representation is borne out by the fact that nearly a quarter of all former members of FARC-EP in the process of reintegration are female. The experience of previous reintegration processes, both in Colombia and beyond, has confirmed the importance of considering the specific capacities and needs of women in such dynamics.

Coordination with the United Nations country team

41. In its resolution 2366 (2017), the Security Council requested that the Verification Mission work in coordination with members of the United Nations country team in Colombia in accordance with their respective mandates. The Verification Mission will deepen the already highly developed relationship between the current Mission and members of the United Nations country team and establish strong coordination arrangements in order to ensure coherence in United Nations support for the implementation of the Final Agreement, given that various entities of the United Nations system have been called upon to provide such support and/or have related protection or verification mandates. As noted above, the current Mission, the members of the United Nations country team and the Office of the Resident Coordinator in Colombia have jointly undertaken an integrated planning process. That process has resulted in the following outcomes:

(a) The development of a shared vision on how the United Nations can contribute to sustainable peace and assist the parties in the implementation of their commitments; and the decision to establish a common information system to ensure appropriate follow-up of implementation and verification activities;

(b) The establishment of new coordination arrangements, including a permanent coordination group co-chaired by the Verification Mission and the Office of the Resident Coordinator, as well as two working groups, focusing on security guarantees and reintegration, respectively, with the participation of the Verification Mission and relevant United Nations entities. This will ensure full consistency and effective coordination in the implementation and verification activities of the United Nations entities in Colombia;

(c) A modified geographical deployment of the Verification Mission so as to ensure co-location between the Mission and 9 of the 13 existing local coordination teams. This will ensure better coordination and allow for the optimum use of resources;

(d) Given the importance of the human rights dimension for peace implementation in general and for the mandate of the Verification Mission in particular, the Mission and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights will have specific arrangements for coordination with a view to ensuring complementarity in the implementation of their respective mandates.

Overall resources

42. Considering the detailed analysis and planning outlined above, the Verification Mission will be smaller overall than the current Mission, while maintaining the required local and regional presence. In order to be able to effectively and efficiently implement the mandate set out in resolution 2366 (2017), the Verification Mission will require approximately 120 unarmed international observers, as well as an appropriate civilian component, as to be decided by the General Assembly in the context of its consideration of the Mission's budget.

V. Observations

43. With the consolidation of the ceasefire and the finalization of the laying down of weapons by FARC-EP, the implementation of the commitments related to the Ceasefire Agreement set out in item 3.1 of the Final Agreement is nearing completion, with the support of the United Nations Mission in Colombia. The Government of Colombia and FARC-EP have requested that, in the wake of this remarkable success, the United Nations undertake verification of the implementation of the reintegration of FARC-EP members and the establishment of security for all in the areas most affected by the five decade-long conflict.

44. From the outset of the negotiations, the parties agreed that bringing an end to the conflict would be an integral and simultaneous process. As mentioned in the present report, since the signing of the Final Agreement, a number of mechanisms and measures have been put in place with regard to both the reintegration of FARC-EP members and the implementation of security guarantees. I have informed the Security Council regularly on several of these developments as part of my reports on the work of the United Nations Mission in Colombia.

45. The United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, established pursuant to Council resolution 2366 (2017), will begin operations on 26 September 2017. The Mission will aim to consolidate the peace process and assist the parties in their efforts to ensure that full social, economic and political reintegration of FARC-EP members is achieved in the shortest time possible and that the rural areas of Colombia hardest hit by the conflict can recover the peace and security to which their communities aspire.

46. Pursuant to resolution 2366 (2017), the United Nations Mission in Colombia, within its current configuration and capacity, has begun some of the provisional work anticipated by the Verification Mission. That work has informed the conclusions of the present report and will also help to ensure a seamless transition from the current Mission to the new one. In addition, it is important to note the extensive consultations that my Special Representative and the current Mission have undertaken with both parties regarding the design, structure and vision for the Verification Mission.

47. I am also highly encouraged by the close coordination and interaction between the current Mission and the United Nations country team, in particular in the integrated planning process that led to many of the recommendations outlined in the present report. The Verification Mission will continue to build on the coordination arrangements with members of the United Nations country team, both in Bogota and at the local level, in order to maximize efficiency and ensure a "whole-of-United Nations" approach. The new Mission will also rely on the expertise of United Nations entities in key thematic areas, including gender, child protection, human rights and ethnic and indigenous issues.

48. One important difference between the current Mission and the new Mission is that the cost-sharing agreements with the Government of Colombia will no longer be applicable, and the Verification Mission will be responsible for providing all support services for its personnel, for which it will require a robust mission support component. To maximize efficiency and ensure a seamless transition, the Verification Mission will build upon existing contracts and arrangements with key providers of the range of mission support assets.

49. While the Verification Mission and the current Mission differ in several respects, they also have key features in common. First, in their areas of deployment, which respond to the need to be present in the rural areas most affected by the

conflict, which are also the areas where the FARC-EP reintegration will take place. Second, in their composition, which include civilian staff and observers with military and police backgrounds, in recognition that both civilian institutions and security forces have key roles to play in the consolidation of peace.

50. In addition the two missions also share a common vision of verification. In keeping with the current Mission, the Verification Mission will maintain close ties at all levels with institutions in charge of implementation and with the beneficiaries of reintegration measures and security guarantees. In particular, the presence of mixed civilian-observer verification teams at the local level must be a tool for the early resolution of differences that inevitably emerge in the process of peacebuilding. Their presence must also be an instrument for building trust, not only in the Verification Mission, but more importantly among all the actors involved in reintegration and the provision of security guarantees. The current Mission has been able to preserve confidence and cooperation in the face of a multiplicity of incidents, that could have undermined the basic level of collaboration required for the consolidation of peace. The Verification Mission will seek to maintain that high level of confidence and cooperation.

51. In conclusion, let me reiterate my appreciation to the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP for entrusting the United Nations with the new task of helping to ensure that the end of the conflict is indeed stable and lasting. In his letter of 5 June 2017, the President of Colombia expressed confidence that the firm support of the United Nations would be instrumental in ensuring that the peace process in Colombia would continue to be implemented as agreed between the parties and would reach a successful conclusion. Through the Verification Mission and the activities of the members of the United Nations country team in Colombia, the United Nations will make every effort to ensure that the peace process in Colombia meets its ambitious goals, and in doing so, continues to inspire other countries to follow the path of peaceful conflict resolution.

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Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2363 (2017), by which the Council extended the mandate of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) until 30 June 2018 and requested me to report, every 60 days, on its implementation. The report provides an update and analysis of the conflict, as well as an overview of the political situation and the operational environment in Darfur, the main challenges to the effective implementation of the mandate, including violations of the status-of-forces agreement, from 6 June to 15 August 2017. It also presents the steps taken by UNAMID towards achieving its benchmarks and provides an update on progress in the implementation of the recommendations of the strategic review, including the financing strategy for the transfer of tasks to the United Nations country team.

II. Conflict analysis

2. Residual clashes between the Government of the Sudan and the Darfur rebel movements that had launched incursions late in May occurred in North Darfur, while the fragmentation of the armed oppositions continued, their breakaway factions forming alliances with or against the Government. Intercommunal fighting also persisted across Darfur, with a slight increase in the number of fatalities compared to the corresponding period of 2016, mainly over land and livestock disputes. Violence against civilians, perpetrated primarily by armed militia, also manifested resource dimensions, the majority of cases occurring in farmland, or as part of the efforts to deter internally displaced persons from returning to their home villages. Civilians were also caught in confrontations between armed militias and government security personnel, including attacks against the police and the Rapid Support Forces. The humanitarian situation was exacerbated by flooding and the outbreak of acute watery diarrhoea in some parts of Darfur. Meanwhile, political reshuffles following the formation of the Government of National Accord were extended to the local level, but the ruling party maintained overall control of the existing structures. Progress pertaining to the Darfur peace process and the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur remained modest, a

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situation compounded by the refusal of the non-signatory movements of the Doha Document to commit themselves to the resumption of talks.[1]

Fighting between the Government of the Sudan and armed groups and its impact on security

3. Following the clashes between the Government and the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi (SLA/MM) and the Sudan Liberation Army/Transitional Council, a splinter faction of the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW), in North and East Darfur, from 20 to 29 May, UNAMID received security clearance to access the Ayn Sero area, 30 km north-west of Kutum in North Darfur, on 8 June. The patrol received reports of civilian casualties and looting in the area. The Government forces and SLA/MM clashed on 9 June in Uru, 39 km north-west of Umm Barru in North Darfur. Eleven SLA/MM members were reportedly killed, while three Sudanese security personnel sustained minor injuries. On 17 June, 13 SLA/MM members surrendered to the Sudanese Armed Forces in Ayn Sero.

4. In Central Darfur, on 10 June, there was a confrontation between the Sudanese Armed Forces and SLA/AW elements in Thur village, 15 km south of Nertiti, triggered by an alleged theft by the latter of livestock belonging to the Nawaibah clan of the Northern Rizeigat. On 14 June, a group of armed Nawaibah attacked internally displaced persons, killing two of them, in Wisa village near the Thur East camp for internally displaced persons. On 18 June, Nawaibah militia clashed with a group of SLA/AW elements in the vicinity of the Thur East camp, which led to the injury of one Nawaibah, followed by the intervention of the Sudanese Armed Forces and police personnel.

5. In Sortony, North Darfur, the situation involving former SLA/AW elements, now called the SLA/Popular Defence (SLA/PD) following their defection to the Government in January 2017, and frictions with the internally displaced populations and Arab nomads in the area, remained precarious. On 17 June, a group of Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers and the Northern Rizeigat from Kube water point, 5 km north-west of Sortony, arrived at the gathering site for internally displaced persons, reportedly to seek missing livestock. Tensions increased as a group of SLA/PD also arrived at the scene in armed vehicles. Although the Sudanese soldiers and Rizeigat personnel returned to Kube after UNAMID troops prevented their entry into the gathering site, the Arab nomads threatened on 18 June to break off any dialogue with the internally displaced persons and resort to violence if the livestock issue was not resolved. On 20 June, UNAMID prevented another attempt by Sudanese Armed Forces and Arab nomads to enter the gathering site in Sortony in search of the SLA/PD leader. On 6 July, Arab militiamen ambushed a group of SLA/PD in Dible village, 10 km west of Sortony, killing four and wounding three others. UNAMID patrols to Kube water point on 17 and 18 July observed that the local residents, predominantly Arabs, had deserted the area, possibly in fear of reprisals.

Intercommunal conflicts

6. Intercommunal violence persisted in Darfur over land and livestock disputes: 10 cases resulted in 74 fatalities, in comparison to 11 clashes resulting in 96 fatalities during the previous period. At the heart of these conflicts are unresolved issues on the use of land for farming or the grazing and migration of livestock. Reconciliation efforts by local governments remained temporary measures, as evident from the frequent breaches of the peace agreements between the

[1] For an assessment of the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, see S/2017/747.

communities. The Government also launched disarmament campaigns to contain violence, but underlying causes of land ownership and access remained unaddressed.

7. In South Darfur, notwithstanding the agreement signed in August 2016 among the leaders of seven major tribes in Shattaya, 94 km north-west of Kass, the Misseriya attacked Fur returnees in the area on 26 June, burning down their properties so that they would leave for a nearby camp for internally displaced persons. The Government deployed security forces and arrested two perpetrators. On 8 June, fighting broke out between the Rizeigat and the Gimir in Sesaban village, 50 km south-east of Katilla, and one Gimir and two Rizeigat were killed. In retaliation, on 9 June, Rizeigat attacked a mosque in Sesaban, during which two Rizeigat, one Gimir and one Fallata were killed. Local authorities deployed forces, and on 15 June, the Rizeigat and the Gimir signed an agreement on cessation of hostilities. On 20 July, armed Fallata in military attire attacked 20 Salamat and killed 5 of them, in Hashabah valley, 16 km south-west of Graida, as the latter were moving with their livestock towards Nyala. In the Dawis area, 14 km north-east of Kass, armed Huttiya Arabs clashed with Tunjur over farmland ownership on 30 July, and five Tunjur were reportedly killed.

8. In Central Darfur, despite the peace agreement signed between the Salamat and the Misseriya on 29 May, the Salamat attacked the Misseriya in the Sure area, 40 km north-east of Um Dukhun, on 12 June, causing the death of one Misseriya.

9. In East Darfur, on 26 June, the conflict between the Ma'aliya and Hamar reignited, despite a reconciliation agreement signed in 2014, when the Ma'aliya clashed with the El Gekhisat clan of the Hamar in Karkadeh village, 18 km west of Sharif, over livestock theft. Six Hamar and three Ma'aliya were killed, and UNAMID accompanied local authorities to visit the area. However, on 28 June, another confrontation occurred at Um Totahana village, 65 km north-east of Adilla, in which one Misseriya inhabitant of the area was killed. On 21 July, a series of clashes occurred between the Ma'aliya and the Rizeigat in Esharaya, 7 km north of Kelikili, and El Mujelid, 60 km north of Ed Daein, which resulted in the death of 14 Rizeigat. Fighting continued on 23 and 24 July in Al Sahab village, 37 km north-west of Abu Karinka, and in Hasab Ala, 17 km north-east of Ed Daein, and resulted in the deaths of two Ma'aliya and 25 Rizeigat. The state government deployed security forces on 24 and 28 July. Sudanese Armed Forces arrived in Ed Daein to disarm and confiscate weapons from the Rizeigat and the Ma'aliya, and arrested traditional leaders and civilians from both communities on 29 July. On 1 August, Rapid Support Forces also started to disarm civilians in Abu Karinka and Adilla, and arrested Ma'aliya leaders and some civilians on 4 August. These measures have generated resentment among the two communities.

Violence against civilians and human rights violations

10. Despite the reduction in the number of armed clashes, the security and human rights situation in Darfur remained volatile. UNAMID documented 94 cases of human rights violations and abuses involving 204 victims, including 22 children, compared to 82 cases involving 124 victims during the previous reporting period. Violations of the right to life accounted for 17 cases involving 81 victims, and violations of the right to physical integrity accounted for 37 cases involving 82 victims. There were 27 cases of sexual and gender-based violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, involving 37 victims, including 9 children, and 3 cases of arbitrary arrest and illegal detention involving 6 victims. There were seven abduction cases involving 27 victims. In total, UNAMID confirmed 63 cases of human rights violations and abuses involving 128 victims, while the remaining 31 cases, with 76 victims, could not be verified owing to various factors, including access restrictions. Of the 94 reported cases, 10 cases involving 22 victims were

reportedly perpetrated by government security forces and auxiliary groups. The remaining 84 cases, with 182 victims, were allegedly perpetrated by unidentified armed men, some described by the victims as Arabs.

11. While the Government has taken steps to strengthen judicial institutions and to combat impunity through the deployment of judges, prosecutors and police personnel in Darfur, victims of human rights violations and abuses continue to report their limited access to justice. The number of investigations of human rights violations remains low, as are success rates by the police in apprehending perpetrators. Investigations were initiated in only 14 of the 94 documented cases, resulting in nine arrests.

12. UNAMID continued to observe abductions and attacks of farmers by armed individuals, often described as Arabs. On 1 July, a farmer was killed in the outskirts of Tawilah, North Darfur, by two armed men described as Arabs. On 9 June, an internally displaced person was shot dead at his farm by members of a militia group outside Mershing, South Darfur. On 18 June, 16 civilians were abducted in Dubu-al-Omda in eastern Jebel Marra in South Darfur, and they have not been released. In another incident on 20 June, armed individuals shot and seriously injured a civilian in Beida, West Darfur. On 18 June a police officer shot and injured a civilian in Habila, West Darfur.

13. UNAMID also recorded 38 incidents of access denial to farms and arbitrary land occupation, in the majority of which nomadic herders claimed ownership of properties on the grounds of prolonged absence by the internally displaced persons. Tensions between farmers and nomadic herders are likely to increase with the onset of the farming season.

14. The plight of internally displaced persons, particularly women and children, remained critical because of insecurity. Internally displaced persons were victims of 101 crimes, which led to 13 fatalities. Other civilians were affected by 217 crimes resulting in 48 fatalities, including cases of murder (37), armed robbery (29), attempted robbery (6), assault/harassment (70), burglary/break-in (5), looting (2), abduction (14), arson (2), shooting (33), attack/ambush (6), threat of violence (4), livestock theft (8) and other crimes (1). The level of criminality and the number of criminality-related deaths remained almost unchanged, compared to the previous 60-day period, when 97 crimes against internally displaced persons resulted in 19 fatalities and 205 crimes with 44 fatalities affected other civilians. Random night shooting in and around camps for internally displaced persons remained a major concern. For example, on 26 June, armed Rapid Support Forces personnel entered the Ardamata camp for internally displaced persons in El Geneina, West Darfur, and fired indiscriminately when residents asked them to leave. They arrested four of the internally displaced persons, who were released later at the intervention of local authorities. Similar shooting incidents were reported in the Krinding and Dorti camps in West Darfur and the Khamsa Dagayeg and Hasahisa camps in Central Darfur.

15. In Central Darfur, on 28 June, two suspected Sudanese Armed Forces soldiers shot and wounded a Fur internally displaced person inside the North camp, 5 km north-east of Nertiti. On the same day, a robbery attempt of a Fur by armed militia in Kaira, 38 km north-east of Nertiti, escalated into a clash that resulted in the death of five militia members and three locals. Fearing retaliation, the locality commissioner instructed the inhabitants to evacuate from the area to Golo, while facilitating reconciliation between the two parties.

16. In South Darfur, on 22 July, Arab nomads attacked a group of Fur internally displaced persons from the Kalma camp who were farming in Hajar Tono, 68 km south-east of Nyala, killing six of them. The incident prompted an unverified

number of internally displaced persons to leave the area and return to the Kalma camp. The Sudanese police deployed reinforcements to the area and arrested two suspects, but on 26 and 27 July armed Arabs shot and wounded a girl and raped two women, respectively, all of whom were returning from Hajar Tono village to the Kalma camp owing to the deterioration in the security situation in the return area.

Crime and banditry

17. Confrontations between armed militia and government security personnel also led to civilian casualties. In West Darfur, on 29 July, a group of Arab herders attacked a police station in Terbiba village, 20 km south-west of Masteri, killing two and injuring three others, including a civilian, in retaliation for the Sudanese police having chased livestock away from a farming area in Terbiba. The Government security forces were deployed to the area to contain the situation.

18. The Government intensified its disarmament campaign. On 6 August, the national high committee for the collection of weapons and non-registered vehicles issued a statement, directing those in possession of weapons, ammunition, explosives or unregistered vehicles to hand them over to the government security institutions, with immediate effect. The following day, the Second Vice-President, Hassabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman, initiated a tour of Darfur to promote the disarmament campaign. On 13 August, the media reported that Musa Hilal and other commanders of the Border Guards Force rejected the government disarmament plan categorically. They also denounced the arrest of Rizeigat and Ma'aliya tribal leaders by the Rapid Support Forces following their clashes in East Darfur, and refused any merger with those forces.

III. Political situation

Darfur peace process

19. While SLA/MM clashed with the Government once during the reporting period, in June, and SLA/AW remained unengaged in the peace process, their breakaway groups and other factions entered piecemeal negotiations with the Government. On 22 June, the Government reported that a faction of SLA/AW led by General Haroon Kilmang Koi had joined the peace process, facilitated by the Governor of Central Darfur. On 2 July, a faction of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM/Sudan) under Abubakar Hamid Noor and Souleyman Jamous announced that the group had presented a list of 15 demands to the Government on which they would engage in talks. On 24 July, a group composed of combatants claiming to be members of JEM, SLA/MM and SLA/AW, led by Adam Ali Ahmed, signed a peace agreement with West Darfur State. Reportedly, the group assembled in Ed Daein, East Darfur, and travelled to West Darfur in seven vehicles and with an unspecified number of weapons.

20. On 16 July, the president of the Sudan Liberation Army/General Command (SLA/GC), Abu Jamal, who had signed a peace agreement with the Government in Koron, Central Darfur, in November 2016, was dismissed by other leaders of the group; the implications of this remain unclear for the faction and its representation in the state-level government. On 6 July, the Sudan Liberation Movement for Justice, the Sudan Liberation Movement-Unity, and a JEM faction led by Abdallah Bishr Gali, all of which are relatively unknown and have a limited presence in Darfur, issued a statement announcing the formation of an alliance called the Sudan Liberation Force Alliance, with Al-Tahir Abu Bakr Hajar as its chairman. The coalition called on other armed groups, including SLA/MM, SLA/AW and JEM, to join the alliance.

Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur

21. There was limited progress with respect to the work of the remaining commissions and fund established under the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, namely the Darfur Land Commission, the Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission, the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, the Security Arrangements Implementation Commission and the Darfur Reconstruction and Development Fund. The presence and capacity of these institutions in Darfur continued to be challenged by the lack of political support, funding and personnel. Funding constraints have also undermined the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation, with an estimated $1.4 million outstanding to complete the process.

National dialogue

22. In accordance with the national dialogue process and its outcome, on 2 July, the President, Omar Hassan al-Bashir, issued a decree extending the unilateral ceasefire by the Government until 2 October 2017. On 3 July, the Prime Minister and First Vice-President, Bakri Hassan Saleh, elevated the Ministers of Investment (from the National Umma Party), Information (from the Democratic Unionist Party), and Higher Education and Scientific Research (from the National Congress Party (NCP)) to the status of Deputy Prime Minister.

23. In Darfur, new cabinets were announced by State Governors between 9 June and 16 July. While nearly half of them were members of the National Congress Party (four out of eight ministers in East, West and North Darfur and 4 out of 10 in South Darfur), other political parties received ministerial posts as follows: four for the National Liberation and Justice Party, three for the Liberation and Justice Party, two for the JEM/Dabajo, and one each for the United Umma Party, the Federal Umma Party, and two parties considered close affiliates of NCP, namely the Democratic Unionist Party and the National Democratic Unionist Party. In addition, SLA/AW breakaway factions (SLA/General Command and SLA/Historical Leadership), JEM breakaway factions (JEM Sudan and JEM Jebel Moon), the Popular Movement for Democratic Rights and the Movement of Popular Force for Rights and Democracy received one ministerial post each, and three other new ministers whose political affiliations are unclear were appointed. Only two women were among the new appointees. New locality commissioners have also been appointed in East, West and South Darfur, where all nine, two of them women, are from NCP. In Central Darfur, seven out of nine were selected from NCP, while the political affiliation of the remaining two is not known.

24. On 11 July, the United States of America postponed its decision with respect to the removal of sanctions against the Sudan for an additional three months, but maintained its prohibition on interaction with individuals associated with the conflict in Darfur. The Government of the Sudan announced a suspension of the negotiations thereafter.

IV. Humanitarian situation

25. There were reports of civilian displacement in the Ayn Sero area, Kutum locality, North Darfur, following the clashes between Government forces and SLA/MM elements in May. These reports remained unverified, as the Government maintained that the situation in the area was stable and there was no need for assistance. In Um Dukhun, Central Darfur, an estimated 4,000 people are reported to have been newly displaced, owing to intercommunal fighting in May, and the humanitarian response is in progress.

26. Flash floods and the outbreak of diseases compounded the humanitarian situation in Darfur. In June, flash floods affected 7,000 people in the Kalma camp for internally displaced persons in South Darfur. Hundreds of shelters were damaged or destroyed, although no injuries or deaths were reported. In July, flooding reportedly affected about 900 households in the Hamidiya and Hasahisa camps for internally displaced persons in Central Darfur, as well as 281 households in Shangil Tobaya in North Darfur. Humanitarian assistance is under way for these areas.

27. The reporting period also witnessed a rapid spread of acute watery diarrhoea in North, East and South Darfur. According to the Government, 424 cases resulting in 19 deaths were reported in North Darfur from 14 June to 21 July, 504 cases resulting in 28 deaths in East Darfur between 20 June and 21 July, and 475 cases resulting in 6 deaths in South Darfur between 28 June and 21 July, the majority of them in the Kalma camp for internally displaced persons.

V. Operating environment

28. The overall environment in which UNAMID and humanitarian personnel operate continued to improve, with fewer criminal incidents and movement restrictions. Nevertheless, delays in the issuance of visas, particularly for human rights personnel, continued to hamper the work of UNAMID, and the backlog of containers at the ports of entry has also not been resolved.

Attacks and threats of attacks on UNAMID and humanitarian actors

29. A total of 40 criminal incidents affected UNAMID personnel during the reporting period compared to 14 in the previous one, and 34 during the same time in 2016. On 20 June, a national staff member was robbed at the UNAMID office in the Hamidiya camp for internally displaced persons in Zalingei, Central Darfur. On 21 June, a group of unidentified men attempted to rob three UNAMID national staff members near the UNAMID compound in El Fasher, North Darfur. Later the same day, three unidentified armed men stopped a local vehicle with three national staff members on board, near the UNAMID compound in El Fasher, robbing them of their personal belongings and carjacking their vehicle. On 22 June, unidentified armed perpetrators carjacked a vehicle belonging to a UNAMID-contracted company, Gulf Catering Company, in El Fasher, and robbed the driver. On 5 July, in two separate incidents, two UNAMID police officers were robbed of their belongings by unidentified armed perpetrators in El Fasher. On 6 August, two armed men carjacked a private vehicle from a national staff member and robbed her of valuables near El Fasher Super Camp. All of these incidents were reported to the Sudanese authorities, but none of the perpetrators has been apprehended.

30. Humanitarian partners encountered several criminal incidents. On 12 June, unidentified perpetrators carjacked a vehicle belonging to an international non-governmental organization in Nyala, South Darfur, and on 1 July unidentified perpetrators broke into a guesthouse occupied by one national staff member of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Ed Daein, East Darfur, and took his personal belongings.

Detention of staff

31. The national staff member who was arrested by the National Intelligence and Security Services in Nyala on 23 November 2016 for alleged espionage has remained in government custody in Khartoum without trial. Another national staff member who was arrested by the Security Services in Ed Daein, East Darfur, on

28 May 2017, for allegedly bribing local government officials and committing other crimes against the State, remains under arrest. The Government has yet to provide any evidence in either case.

Access restrictions

32. There were only two incidents of access denial during the reporting period. On 27 June, a UNAMID patrol was denied access to the Nigea camp for internally displaced persons in Shearia, East Darfur, by National Intelligence and Security Services personnel, who claimed that training for internally displaced persons was being conducted without informing the Government and threatened to attack UNAMID patrols in the area. On 28 June, a UNAMID patrol was denied access by the Security Services to Khazanjadeed, north-east of Shearia, because of an alleged breakout of acute watery diarrhoea. On 19 July, Sudanese Armed Forces personnel at a checkpoint near Kidingeer village in South Darfur fired at a UNAMID patrol. No injuries were reported, and the Government claimed that the patrol was mistaken for an armed group.

33. UNAMID did not experience any air movement restrictions during the reporting period. However, there were occasional bureaucratic impediments to air mobility, including delays in the approval of flight schedules, prohibition of flights between team sites in different sectors, and limits on air operation hours.

34. The humanitarian operating environment continued to improve, compared to the previous year, and partners reported faster approval for movements within Darfur and fewer denials of access. Agreement was also reached between the Humanitarian Aid Commission and international non-governmental organizations regarding the process for the recruitment of national staff, but implementation has yet to be monitored. The overall compliance with the revised humanitarian directives issued in December 2016, however, remained inconsistent across Darfur States, an example of which included access constraints concerning Ayn Sero in North Darfur. The inter-agency mission to Deribat, South Darfur, has been postponed because of insecurity, and a humanitarian mission to Rockero, Central Darfur, was postponed several times, until it was finally carried out from 5 to 9 July. On 10 August, two unknown armed men carjacked a vehicle belonging to the United Nations Population Fund near its office in Nyala.

Visas and customs clearance

35. The Government granted 742 visas for UNAMID, including 445 for military and police personnel, 123 for official visitors, 130 for contractors and 44 for international staff and dependents. A total of 139 visa requests have been pending beyond the normal period of 15 days, some of them since January 2016. These include 8 cases for police, 27 cases for contractors, 32 cases for official visitors, 22 cases for military personnel, 40 cases for civilian staff, and 10 cases for United Nations Volunteers. Only 1 visa was approved for the human rights section of UNAMID, and 21 additional visas remain pending. The current vacancy rate for the human rights section remains at 46 per cent, while the overall vacancy rate for international civilian staff is 16 per cent, 5.4 per cent of that attributable to pending visas.

36. The Sudanese authorities have released food ration containers progressively, as they arrive at Port Sudan. However, customs clearances for 114 shipments of contingent-owned and United Nations-owned equipment remained pending, some since April 2015. These shipments include 1 armoured personnel carrier, 10 vehicles, communications and information technology equipment, generators, submersible pumps and spare parts for vehicles. The delays have resulted in

demurrage charges and other costs incurred by troop- and police-contributing countries associated with the inspection and repair of equipment. In addition, the Government has not granted the certificate of taxation exemption for goods imported by sea in 2016 and 2017. The Government has since informed UNAMID that the certificate of taxation exemption has been replaced by a new system.

VI. Progress towards the achievement of the strategic objectives of UNAMID

Protection of civilians

37. UNAMID completed the roll-out of its refined strategy for the protection of civilians across the mission area, while its integrated field protection teams conducted 37 missions in West Darfur, 21 in North Darfur and 3 in Central Darfur. In addition, the teams addressed immediate threats to women identified by the women protection networks, supported by UNAMID, by accelerating weekly patrols by UNAMID police and military during grass and firewood collection.

38. In West Darfur, internally displaced persons and farmers raised concerns about harassment, intimidation and denial of access to farms; women reported cases of harassment by herders during firewood collection. In response, UNAMID consulted with the women's groups from all camps for internally displaced persons in El Geneina, collected specific details regarding incident-prone locations, timings and days, and adjusted military and police patrol plans to ensure increased visibility. In Central Darfur, the integrated field protection teams conducted a verification patrol to Thur to investigate allegations of the attack against internally displaced persons in the Wisa area on 10 June. The teams engaged with the local security committee which then held a series of meetings with the Arab communities, as well as internally displaced persons, to normalize the situation. UNAMID has since carried out follow-up visits to the area at least twice a week. In North Darfur, the teams visited the Korma camp for internally displaced persons and surrounding villages, where concerns were raised regarding harassment and intimidation during farming activities. In response, UNAMID developed a plan to intensify the protection of farming areas during the harvesting season, from June to October. The plan included increased joint advocacy and engagement with herders, farmers and internally displaced persons on farm protection issues, the conduct of regular security meetings with local authorities and crop protection committees to enhance the sensitization of local communities, and an intensification of the number and duration of farming patrols in consultation with internally displaced farmers. In South Darfur, internally displaced persons and other stakeholders in the Menawashei and Khor Abeche areas also expressed similar security concerns as the farming season started. UNAMID collaborated with humanitarian agencies in the revitalization and rehabilitation of basic social services in Shattaya locality to support 256 returnee households. At the request of UNAMID, the Sudanese security forces deployed to the area, and brokered mediation to defuse tension.

39. In total, UNAMID military conducted 17,190 patrols, including 8,889 patrols aimed at protecting civilians. These consisted of 6,291 short-range patrols, 391 long-range patrols and 2,207 evening patrols. In total, UNAMID conducted 4,162 visits to villages and 2,113 visits to camps for internally displaced persons. Separately, UNAMID police conducted 5,005 patrols in support of physical protection of civilians, including 2,367 confidence-building patrols to camps for the displaced and 2,638 patrols to respond to the security needs of the internally displaced, particularly women and children engaged in livelihood activities outside their camps. In addition, UNAMID police undertook 537 joint patrols with

community policing volunteers. The patrols helped to monitor security and provide a safe and protective environment in camps for the displaced.

40. In coordination with humanitarian agencies, UNAMID provided 365 round-trip escorts for United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, civil society and humanitarian partners in support of the delivery and monitoring of humanitarian assistance, humanitarian assessment and verification missions, and the stockpiling of humanitarian items at its team sites in advance of the rainy season. The escorts included a humanitarian inter-agency assessment mission, as well as a registration mission by the International Organization for Migration to Rockero and Golo in Jebel Marra and 11 logistics convoys of the World Food Programme (WFP) consisting of 87 trucks carrying 1,947 tons of food and 46 tons of non-food items, mainly in North Darfur. UNAMID also continued to provide security for WFP warehouses in various locations, including El Fasher and Sortony in North Darfur. Moreover, UNAMID continued to provide daily escort to humanitarian water, hygiene and sanitation partners transporting water from Kube to the Sortony gathering site. Similarly, UNAMID provided armed escorts twice a week for humanitarian supplies between Sortony and Kabkabiyah in North Darfur, where the road remains blocked for commercial trucks since May 2016.

41. UNAMID continued to engage the authorities on their obligations to respect and protect the rights of civilians and to combat impunity. In partnership with the Government, from 20 to 22 June, 30 prison managers, including 2 female officers, were trained in human rights and the professional aspects of prison management. In addition, on 29 and 30 June, 20 prosecutors and police investigators in Zalingei, Central Darfur, were trained in international fair trial standards and investigations.

42. UNAMID continued to advocate for the swift deployment of mobile prosecutors to underserviced areas, which has been delayed because of financial constraints. UNAMID also stressed the need to strengthen the office of the Special Prosecutor fo. the crimes committed in Darfur, which, according to the ministerial directive of July 2016, was tasked to investigate and prosecute all rape cases in Darfur. These cases continue to be tried in ordinary courts, however, as exemplified by the trial of an adult male, accused of raping a 2-year-old girl, in the Juvenile Court in West Darfur on 3 and 10 July.

43. With respect to gender, UNAMID visited the camps for internally displaced persons in Hamidiya, Central Darfur, and Kass, Erly and Alfaneeya, South Darfur, on 5 and 6 July, respectively, to monitor issues relating to the protection of women. On 14 June, in Zalingei, UNAMID concluded a three-day workshop on sexual and gender-based violence prevention and response for 18 Sudanese women police officers. At a meeting with the Special Prosecutor for crimes committed in Darfur, in Nyala, South Darfur, on 19 June, the Prosecutor acknowledged challenges relating to the non-reporting of cases concerning female victims, for fear of stigmatization and reprisals, and underscored the need for collaboration in addressing them.

44. In an effort to promote local awareness and ownership on child protection issues, UNAMID conducted six training and sensitization events, which benefited 155 community members (61 men and 94 women). Following advocacy by UNAMID, on 9 July, the Sudanese Armed Forces disclosed information about the investigation into the alleged recruitment of a 14-year old boy by the Rapid Support Forces in Jourouf village, South Darfur, confirming that the name of the child could not be found among recent recruits.

45. UNAMID, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme and the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, supported the launch of the second phase of the reintegration process for 1,400 of

3,000 ex-combatants who had been demobilized since 2014 and whose cases were still pending. From 12 to 15 June, 42 demobilized ex-combatants participated in the reintegration programme in Zalingei, Central Darfur, while on 14 June the reintegration exercise was launched for 300 demobilized ex-combatants in Nyala, South Darfur. From 25 to 27 July, a similar exercise was launched in El Fasher, also targeting 300 ex-combatants. The reintegration package included small business start-up kits, agricultural implements as well as the provision of livestock and training in animal husbandry. In addition, UNAMID continued the implementation of 26 community stabilization projects in 12 localities across Darfur, benefiting 2,255 young people (1,142 male and 1,113 female). The projects included livelihood development, vocational skills training, infrastructure development and support of rule of law institutions, with a view to preventing the recruitment of civilians into armed or criminal groups. Several quick-impact projects were completed during the reporting period, including a handover of equipment on 21 June to the outreach and training centre at El Geneina Radio station, and a women's dormitory and kitchen at Ardamata prison on 6 July in West Darfur.

46. UNAMID continued to address the threats posed by explosive remnants of war by deploying response teams throughout Darfur, with particular focus on areas adjacent to Jebel Marra. The teams conducted assessments and disposal operations in 61 hazard areas, where 1,840 items of unexploded ordnance were destroyed. These operations enabled safe access for UNAMID patrols and delivery of humanitarian aid in areas otherwise inaccessible, and improved security for the affected local communities.

Support for an inclusive peace process

47. Throughout the reporting period, the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative for Darfur, Jeremiah Kingsley Mamabolo, continued to support the peace process for Darfur. On 9 June, the Joint Special Representative met with Minni Minawi and Gibril Ibrahim, the leaders of SLA/MM and JEM, in Paris, following their clashes with the Government in North and East Darfur in May and June. Both claimed that their groups did not violate the unilateral ceasefire, that the clashes were initiated by the Government forces, and that only a mutually agreed ceasefire could guarantee a lasting cessation of hostilities. The two, however, agreed to issue a statement reiterating their commitment to finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

48. In another engagement in Paris, on 10 June, Abdul Wahid stated that he would fulfil his commitment made to the Joint Special Representative in May by making a public announcement to clarify his movement's position on a peaceful resolution to the conflict. The announcement has yet to be made.

49. On 2 July, on the sidelines of the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa, the Joint Special Representative briefed the Chairperson of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, President Thabo Mbeki, on the position of the Government and the movements regarding the resumption of talks. They discussed the prospect for convening, at the request of SLA/MM and JEM/Gibril, another round of talks on the cessation of hostilities with the Government, contingent upon their genuine commitment to the suspension of fighting.

50. In support of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation, UNAMID facilitated a total of three consultations at the locality level, in the southern part of Nyala, South Darfur, on 25 and 26 July, and in the northern part of Nyala and in Kornoi, North Darfur, on 1 and 2 August. Approximately 150 participants at each session, representing civil society, internally displaced persons, native administrations, religious leaders, nomads, farmers, women, youth and academia

discussed a range of issues, including governance, security, development, justice, reconciliation, and land-related concerns. As of August, 67 of 68 locality-level consultations have been conducted.

Mitigation of intercommunal violence

51. UNAMID, in collaboration with the Sudanese authorities, the United Nations country team and other stakeholders, continued to support the mediation of communal conflicts across Darfur. Six meetings were held to encourage peaceful coexistence and support the implementation of peace agreements signed between various groups, including those between the Salamat and the Misseriya in Central Darfur (on 6, 12 and 28 June), the Ma'aliya and the Southern Rizeigat in East Darfur (on 26 June), and the Gimir and Rizeigat (on 18 June) and the Fallata and the Masalit (on 19 June) in South Darfur.

52. Following the breach of the reconciliation agreement between the Salamat and the Misseriya on 12 June in Central Darfur, UNAMID engaged Salamat leaders to work with local authorities for the enhancement of the rule of law and prevention of further violations. On 26 June, UNAMID participated in a meeting in Abu Karinka between the Ma'aliya native administration and a Rizeigat delegation from Ed Daein, East Darfur, aimed at strengthening relations between the two groups. In West Darfur, on 19 June and 8 July, UNAMID and the native administration leaders in Masteri and Umsebeka disseminated the outcome documents of the peaceful coexistence conference, held in El Geneina, on 15 May.

53. To prevent seasonal farming-related communal conflicts, UNAMID held two meetings in North Darfur (on 14 and 29 June), three in West Darfur (on 5 and 20 June and 6 July), two in Central Darfur (on 5 and 21 June) and two in East Darfur (on 4 and 8 July), bringing together native administrations, peaceful coexistence and agricultural protection committees, farmers, nomadic herders, local authorities and community leaders, as well as the United Nations country team. UNAMID also conducted five peaceful coexistence forums for farmers and herders in Tawilah and Korma in North Darfur (9 and 11 July), Umsebeka in West Darfur (12 July), Ed Daein in East Darfur (12 July) and the Bulbul Tembisco administrative unit in South Darfur (19 July). The participants in the forums discussed a range of mitigating measures, such as dialogue forums, social peace awareness campaigns, demarcation of livestock migration routes, and community projects aimed at improving access to water.

VII. Progress in the implementation of the recommendations of the strategic review

54. The mission advanced with the implementation of the reconfiguration of UNAMID in accordance with resolution 2363 (2017). In collaboration with the Secretariat, it devised a new mission concept and a reconfiguration plan to meet the deadlines of the first phase of its reconfiguration. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations visited the Sudan from 19 to 23 July and engaged with Government officials, UNAMID personnel, and other partners to take forward the implementation of the recommendations of the strategic review. UNAMID also engaged the Government at the state level to discuss its new configuration and focus, including a meeting with four of the five Governors on 6 August.

Military and police drawdown and the impact of reconfiguration on protection needs and human rights

55. UNAMID has commenced the first phase of its reconfiguration involving the closure of 11 team sites and the reduction of military personnel strength from 15,845 to 11,395 and police personnel strength from 3,403 to 2,888. Six team sites are expected to be closed by the end of August. Troops have withdrawn from Foro Burunga and Habila in West Darfur, except for rear parties in the process of clearing their contingent-owned equipment. The departure of a battalion from El Geneina was completed on 22 July, to be followed by the repatriation of its contingent-owned equipment. A relocation order has been issued for troops in Muhajiriyah and Shearia in East Darfur, and Mellit, Al-Malihah, Tine and Um Kaddadah in North Darfur.

56. Individual police officers have been redeployed from 10 out of 11 closing team sites, including Foro Burunga and Habila in West Darfur, Muhajiriyah in East Darfur, Tine, El Fasher-2 (Abou Shouk), Al-Malihah, Mellit and Um Kaddadah in North Darfur, and Tulus and Edd al-Fursan in South Darfur. The process of closing the one remaining team site, Zamzam in El Fasher in North Darfur, will commence by September. One formed police unit was redeployed from Ed Daein to Shearia on 14 August to take over camp security from departing troops.

Jebel Marra Task Force

57. Following the adoption of resolution 2363 (2017), UNAMID submitted a formal request to the Government on 2 July seeking its cooperation with the reconfiguration of UNAMID, including the establishment of a new team site in Golo, Central Darfur. Concurrently, UNAMID developed plans to deploy the Jebel Marra Task Force, including its headquarters arrangements, once the land for the team site is granted. The protection strategy for the Jebel Marra region is also being formulated, with a view to ensuring coordination with humanitarian partners and tailoring military and police activities in response to the specific needs of the area. As at 15 August, the Government has not yet provided a response. The Secretariat, working with the African Union, will continue to engage the authorities and to impress upon them the need for them to urgently facilitate the establishment of the team site in Golo. The Security Council will be regularly updated on developments concerning the matter.

Civilian staffing review

58. On the basis of a self-assessment exercise by UNAMID to identify its staffing needs and proposals, and further to consultations and reviews at the Headquarters level, a team from the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support travelled to UNAMID from 31 July to 6 August to finalize the conclusions of the civilian staffing review and its recommendations. A reduction of civilian personnel commensurate with the new troop ceiling and configuration of UNAMID will be reflected in the submission of the revised UNAMID budget for 2017/18 by 8 September.

Joint UNAMID-United Nations country team financing strategy for sustaining peace in Darfur

59. Drawing on the strategic review of UNAMID, as well as the United Nations Development Assistance Framework for 2018-2021 completed on 25 April 2017, and the multi-year humanitarian strategy for 2017-2019 and the humanitarian response plan for 2017 finalized in May 2017, UNAMID and the United Nations country team are in the process of developing a new integrated strategic framework

for the period 2017-2019 to articulate common priorities and complementary efforts for peace consolidation in Darfur in the context of the drawdown of UNAMID. Informed by the field-level consultations, the new framework will serve as the United Nations strategy for sustaining peace in Darfur, with a particular focus on the rule of law and human rights, durable solutions for displacement, and peacebuilding for community security.

60. The lack of resources available to the United Nations country team to support peace consolidation in areas where it is relevant has posed a serious obstacle. A number of tasks discontinued by UNAMID following its streamlining exercise in 2014 remain suspended, for example those related to gender and HIV/AIDS. Following the completion of the integrated strategic framework, expected by the end of August, UNAMID and the country team will develop a joint financing strategy to mobilize resources for its implementation. The financing strategy will elaborate, inter alia, the ways in which to promote national ownership of the transition process and initiatives, geographic and time-bound prioritization and sequencing of key tasks, strategic communication and outreach, as well as further dialogue regarding the use of programmatic funding in peacekeeping budgets and transfer of personnel, funds and other assets to the country team partners to ensure that sufficient capacity is put in place to fill the gaps that are likely to emerge, once the drawdown of UNAMID progresses.

VIII. Financial aspects

61. The General Assembly, by its resolution 71/310 of 30 June 2017, authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the Operation in an amount not exceeding $486.0 million for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2017.

62. As at 10 August 2017, unpaid assessed contributions to the Special Account for UNAMID amounted to $461.4 million. Total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $4,721.9 million.

63. Reimbursement of troop and formed police costs has been made for the period up to 30 April 2017, while reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment has been made for the period up to 31 March 2017, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule

IX. Observations

64. Ten years have passed since the United Nations, together with the African Union, began planning for the deployment of a multidimensional peacekeeping mission to Darfur. UNAMID was difficult to establish, given the terrain and local conditions on the ground, while the political process to resolve the conflict through inclusive dialogue lagged behind. Today, as UNAMID begins the first phase of its drawdown, some of the same issues and conditions that caused the conflict and rendered the mission's operationalization difficult persist, while other aspects of the conflict have evolved. The rebel groups have been weakened significantly for the most part, although skirmishes resurfaced and continued in May and June. The underlying drivers of the conflict, including violent competition over land, water and other scarce resources, continue to threaten the lives of the people of Darfur, while their consequences — most notably, large-scale and prolonged displacement — further complicate local security and resource management. The mobilization and arming of militias as part of the counter-insurgency strategy adopted by the Government has exacerbated intercommunal tensions, to the point of undermining the authority of local governments to establish and maintain law and order. Civilians,

including internally displaced persons, women and children, are particularly vulnerable in this context, unable to earn a living or return home without fear of intimidation, persecution, rape and other forms of violence, and loss of life, particularly at the hands of the armed militias.

65. The issue of accountability as it relates to the armed militias, and wider security sector reform, is a complex and yet crucial matter for the stabilization and protection of civilians in Darfur. I encourage the Government to explore measures to advance the disarmament of militias and security sector reform, in line with the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, as a matter of priority. It is equally important that the remaining commissions and fund of the Doha Document articulate the next steps, with sufficient resources and political support from the Government of National Accord, to fulfil the remaining work, which is considerable.

66. The prospect of substantive negotiations between the Government and movements that are not signatories to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur remains elusive. The Government maintains its position, which is to negotiate on the basis of the Doha Document, but none of the non-signatory movements appears committed to resuming talks in those terms. While preliminary consultations continue outside the Sudan, their constituencies languish in the camps for internally displaced persons. It is the responsibility of those leading the Government and the non-signatory movements to resolve differences in their views on the provisions of the Doha Document, as they remain relevant in addressing the grievances of the people of Darfur. I urge the Government and the armed movements to honour their unilateral declarations on the cessation of hostilities and move on to the next steps in the peace process, facilitated by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, with the support of the United Nations Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan and the Joint Special Representative for Darfur and Head of UNAMID.

67. While the governance reform, in accordance with the outcome of the national dialogue, continues, it is imperative that efforts continue to ensure that the process is inclusive and transparent. It is also essential that the new state structures, at the level of both the Government of National Accord and the Darfur States, support the implementation of the remaining provisions of the Doha Document. UNAMID will continue to engage Sudanese authorities in this regard. Similarly, further efforts must be made to extend state authority across Darfur, especially in areas from which UNAMID is withdrawing, in a manner that ensures the protection of civilians, the safe and voluntary return of internally displaced persons, and inclusive and sustainable peacebuilding by the Government.

68. In this connection, I call on the Government, donor countries, and other partners to allocate sufficient resources for peacebuilding activities in Darfur. The United Nations country team will lead efforts relating to women, girls and child protection in the context of the rule of law, durable solutions and community stabilization efforts outlined in the new integrated strategic framework. The mobilization of resources for the country team to support these cross-cutting themes will underpin the collective efforts of the United Nations in Darfur. All the same, it is the obligation of the Sudanese authorities to provide basic services and promote livelihood opportunities in Darfur from their national and local budgetary sources. An eventual drawdown of UNAMID without adequate mechanisms to address these fundamental requirements for sustainable peace means that the causes and consequences of the conflict remain unaddressed, thereby posing the risk of a recurrence of the conflict.

69. While we make every effort to proceed with the drawdown of UNAMID, the cooperation of the Government of the Sudan is indispensable for its timely implementation. This includes not only logistical and security assurances for the

closure of team sites and the repatriation and relocation of UNAMID personnel, but also the establishment of a new team site in Golo to establish the Jebel Marra Task Force, which is a critical component in the new strategy of UNAMID. I urge the Government to approve the provision of land for a new temporary operating base in Golo and grant clearances for the deployment of the Task Force expeditiously. I also call on the Government to expedite the process of addressing outstanding operational restrictions, including the issuing of pending visas, the release of remaining containers by facilitating customs clearances, and the granting to UNAMID of the certificate of tax exemption for goods imported by sea in accordance with the status-of-forces agreement. This is all the more imperative as the footprint of UNAMID will decrease significantly over the coming months. It is my expectation that the Government will live up to all obligations in this respect, sustaining the positive spirit that characterized the review process of UNAMID, and meet all the pressing protection needs of the affected civilian population.

70. I would like to conclude by thanking the Joint Special Representative, Jeremiah Kingsley Mamabolo, and all of the staff of UNAMID, the United Nations country team and the humanitarian community, who continue their tireless efforts to improve the lives of the people of Darfur. I also commend my Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan, Nicholas Haysom, and former Presidents Thabo Mbeki and Abdulsalami Abubakar of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel for their unceasing efforts to resolve the conflicts in the Sudan.

Map No. 4007 Rev. 29 UNITED NATIONS
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Department of Field Support
Geospatial Information Section (formerly Cartographic Section)

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Security Council

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Letter dated 30 August 2017 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to resolution 2363 (2017) of 29 June 2017, in which the Security Council requested that I provide an assessment of the status of implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in the next 60-day report on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).*

Please find enclosed the review of the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (see annex).

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

* The report is circulated under the symbol S/2017/748.

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Annex

Implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and Security Council resolution 2363 (2017)

1. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur, although still contested by three holdout armed movements six years after its adoption by the Government of the Sudan and a number of breakaway groups, laid the ground for a number of institutional and legislative reforms, and political and security arrangements, which, if implemented in a sustainable way, may address the main root causes of the Darfur rebellion. In this context, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), through its mandate on the protection of civilians, support to the political process and the mediation of intercommunal conflicts, plays a critical role in the implementation of the Doha Document's provisions relating to internally displaced persons, security arrangements, justice and reconciliation, and internal dialogue and consultation.

2. The following assessment focuses only on those provisions of the Doha Document which are relevant to and within the purview of the mission's mandate in line with Security Council resolution 2363 (2017), whereas its comprehensive evaluation belongs to the parties, the Implementation Follow-up Commission, and ultimately to the people of Darfur.

Protection of civilians and facilitation of humanitarian access

3. While the institutional framework and the physical infrastructure have been gradually established since the early stages of the implementation of the Doha Document, these achievements have not yet resulted in durable solutions for internally displaced persons, mainly because of concerns over security, access to land and provision of services. The Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission was part of the Darfur Regional Authority since 2012, and it continues to function within the successor to the Authority, the Darfur Peace Follow-up Office. Despite its plans for new projects, the Commission is not able to implement them, for lack of funding and staff. Furthermore, since 2012, a total of 703 voluntary return villages have been established across 48 localities in Darfur, including 192 in South Darfur, 79 in Central Darfur, 94 in East Darfur, 134 in West Darfur and 204 in North Darfur. Internally displaced persons are, however, reluctant to return, citing concerns about harassment by armed militia and the lack of sustainable services. Moreover, the implementation of provisions on the issuance of cards for internally displaced persons and their compensations has been slow to date.

4. In the same context, two issues related to the Doha Document with major impact on the protection of civilians and the provision of durable solutions for the internally displaced, namely the future of militia groups and civilian disarmament, remain to be addressed in a comprehensive way. My special report on the strategic review of UNAMID, prepared jointly with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (S/2017/437), provides an analysis of both issues as a significant source of insecurity for the 2.7 million internally displaced persons in Darfur. In August, the Government, through Vice-President Hassabo Mohamed Abdel Rahman, Chairman of the Darfur Disarmament Higher Committee, established in April 2016, launched the process for the collection of weapons from the civilian population and the militia. In the meantime, measurable progress has been achieved on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the former combatants. A total of 4,028 ex-combatants were demobilized under the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2009-2011 and, as at 15 August 2017, 6,232 combatants have been demobilized under the Doha Document. UNAMID, in collaboration with the Sudan Disarmament,

Demobilization and Reintegration Commission, has provided technical and logistical support, as well as the payment of transition safety allowances. Funding gaps have delayed the provision of reintegration assistance, which could potentially jeopardize the sustainability of past achievements.

5. Against this backdrop, the restoration/extension of State authority, especially in the areas of the rule of law, including human rights, and the security sector, creates the necessary enabling environment for long-term solutions. Key institutions related to justice and reconciliation have been established since 2012, specifically the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Criminal Court on the Events in Darfur, with "jurisdiction over gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Darfur since February 2003". Furthermore, in April 2016, the National Supreme Court Division for the Darfur States was established in Nyala, South Darfur, constituted of nine Supreme Court judges, with jurisdiction over appeals in criminal and civil cases. Since January 2015, 74 prosecutors have reportedly been deployed across all Darfur localities and, in 2016, new district court magistrates were deployed in Ed Daein, East Darfur, and, more recently, in South Darfur. In 2016, some 200 rural courts were reportedly present in Darfur, dealing mainly with land disputes. In addition, some 13,000 police officers are deployed across Darfur. The functioning, however, of all these institutions is severely hampered by the lack of resources and available funds: the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission has reportedly completed the mapping and analysis of conflicts, but there have been no further activities; the prosecutors are complaining about lack of equipment, especially in remote areas; furthermore, the Special Court is seen as largely ineffective by human rights organizations because of lack of resources and political will. Addressing these challenges requires great political will on the part of the Sudanese authorities.

Mediation between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory armed movements

6. On the political front, there were significant developments: the establishment of the Darfur Regional Authority and the inclusion of the Doha Document in the Interim Constitution of the Sudan. Likewise, key institutional structures within the "permanent ceasefire and security arrangements" were put in place at a very early stage of the implementation of the Doha Document. The Ceasefire Commission and the Joint Commission, where UNAMID has leading functions, were set up in 2011, while the Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission was established in 2012 as part of the Darfur Regional Authority. A comprehensive ceasefire has not materialized, while three armed movements, the Sudan Liberation Army/Abdul Wahid, the Sudan Liberation Army/Minni Minawi and the Justice and Equality Movement, are contesting the Doha Document as the framework for a political agreement and to date have yet to sign a cessation of hostilities. In its absence, the Government and the rebel groups continue to extend unilateral ceasefires.

7. Provisions relating to the Darfur Regional Authority and its residual commissions, after its closure in 2016, and the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation are critical to the implementation of the Doha Document and also lay at the core of the UNAMID mandate, as stipulated by the Security Council in its resolution 2363 (2017) and detailed in the joint special report (S/2017/437). The Darfur Regional Authority successfully implemented a number of provisions of the Doha Document, and then was dissolved in 2016. While its residual commissions have been part of the Darfur Peace Follow-up Office under the Presidency since January 2017, they need to be adequately resourced and empowered to carry out their mandates. In the meantime, despite major delays and lack of funds, consultations in the context of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation are

about to conclude, pending their conduct in one locality in the third and final stage of the process, supported by UNAMID. A parallel process of national dialogue was launched in 2015 as a means of achieving consensus on constitutional reform in the Sudan, which concluded in October 2016 with the adoption of a national document. A list of 981 recommendations on system of government, the principle of democracy, the concept of equal citizenship and the diverse Sudanese identity are agreed upon as the basis for the drafting of a new constitution. Under criticism by opposition groups for a non-inclusive process, the Government has expressed openness for them to join the process. Against this backdrop, ways should be explored of channelling the findings of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation in the constitutional review process, on the basis of the national document.

Mediation of intercommunal conflicts

8. As intercommunal conflicts in Darfur are one of the main sources of violence and directly related to the root causes of conflict (see S/2017/437), institutional arrangements and interventions in this area have direct impact on achieving a sustainable peace in Darfur. The provisions of the Doha Document on the establishment of the joint coordination committees, to deal with early warning and prevention of escalation at the Darfur States level, and the Darfur Land Commission have been completed. Furthermore, progress is reported on the completion of the mapping database of land use, but it is not clear whether other provisions on the membership in the National Petroleum Commission and the benefits from the oil revenues have been implemented. Besides, the Land Act, a major legislative development in addressing one of the main causes at the root of the Darfur rebellion, has not yet been adopted. UNAMID is mandated to provide support to mechanisms of local conflict resolution and also, in coordination with the United Nations country team, to provide technical assistance and logistical support towards establishing an institutional and legal framework to address the root causes of conflict.

Observations

9. Six years after the adoption of the Doha Document, the people of Darfur have yet to fully benefit from the political realities and the legislative space that agreement created, as the implementation of its provisions remains uneven and unsustainable. Despite achievements accomplished thus far on the setting up of the necessary institutional and legal framework, the lack of an all-inclusive political agreement and commitment, as well as operational and resource challenges, are having a serious impact on its outcome. In this context, the review of the national constitution on the basis of the national document and the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation, the completion of a permanent ceasefire with armed movements, the disarmament of the civilian population and the militia, the adoption of the Land Act and the functioning of institutions established under the Doha Document remain key prerequisites for achieving sustainable peace in Darfur.

Engagement framework for the implementation of Security Council resolution 2363 (2017)

A. Protection of civilians and facilitation of humanitarian access

Security Council resolution 2363 (2017)	*Provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*	*Role of UNAMID*	*Institutional achievements: progress to date*	*Legal policy achievements: progress to date*
Protection of internally displaced persons				
Protect civilians across Darfur, including women and children	Modalities in place to provide security and protection from all forms of physical attack, with support from UNAMID [*art. 44, paras. 226-229; art. 45, paras. 230-231*]	Preventative and pre-emptive posture. Secure internally displaced person camps and areas of return. Mission-wide protection of civilians strategy.	Ongoing	
Humanitarian access				
Removal of obstacles to UNAMID/ humanitarian actors to reach conflict-affected areas	Modalities in place to ensure full access by UNAMID/United Nations [*art. 45, para. 233*]			New directives from the Humanitarian Aid Commission of December 2016 improved humanitarian access
Durable solutions for internally displaced persons				
Through return to areas of origin or resettlement in their current areas	Mechanisms and modalities in place to ensure freedom of movement of internally displaced persons [*art. 46, paras. 235-237; art. 47, para. 238; art. 48, paras. 239-240*]	Create security conditions for provision of humanitarian assistance and to facilitate return	Issuance of identity cards ongoing	
	Conditions in place to ensure the right to voluntary return [*art. 49, paras. 241-246*]	With United Nations humanitarian/country team assist in creating conditions conducive to voluntary and sustainable return	703 return villages established since 2012 across Darfur	
	Mechanisms in place to ensure necessary conditions for return of internally displaced persons [*art. 50, para. 249*]			

Security Council resolution 2363 (2017)	*Provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*	*Role of UNAMID*	*Institutional achievements: progress to date*	*Legal/policy achievements: progress to date*
	Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission fully functioning [*art. 51, paras. 252-259*]	In coordination with the United Nations country team, provision of technical assistance and logistical support to the residual commissions of the former Darfur Regional Authority	Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission established in 2011. New projects for 2017 but currently it lacks funding and staffing.	
	Compensation/Jabr al Darar mechanism fully functional [*art. 57, paras. 301-304*]			
Restoration/extension of State authority (stabilizing the situation)				
Support the Government of the Sudan police			13,000 police officers deployed in 74 police stations and 54 police substations across Darfur	
Support national mine-action institutions	Conditions suitable for return [*art. 50, para. 249 (iii)*]	Technical mine-action advice and coordination, and demining capacity in support of national institutions		
Assist in the implementation of the provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur related to human rights and rule of law	Promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms [*art. 1, paras. 1-18; art. 61, para. 331*] Facilitate access to justice [*art. 56, paras. 296 (i)-(v)*]	Provide advice and logistical support for development of transitional justice and human rights institutions (Special Court for Darfur, criminal justice institutions, rural courts) in areas of return	In 2016, the National Human Rights Commission's regional office established in El Fasher. In April 2016, National Supreme Court division for Darfur established and new district court magistrates deployed. Lack of resources. In 2016, 200 rural courts were reported in Darfur dealing mainly with land disputes.	

Security Council resolution 2363 (2017)	*Provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*	*Role of UNAMID*	*Institutional achievements: progress to date*	*Legal policy achievements: progress to date*
	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission fully functioning [*art. 58, paras. 311-321*]		Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission established in 2012. Completed mapping and analysis of conflict. No follow-up activities.	
	Special Court for Darfur [*art. 59, paras. 322-328*]		Special Court for Darfur established in 2012. The majority of cases are referred to the regular courts.	
Security-sector reform related issues, including militias and disarmament, pursuant to the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur and guided by the African Union security sector reform framework	Reform of some military institutions in Darfur and need for funding and experts [*art. 74, paras. 463-464*]			
	Disarmament of militia groups and the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan [*art. 67, paras. 399-401*]	Technical and logistical assistance to the Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Commission on strategy and plans.	Civilian disarmament officially launched by the Second Vice-President in August 2017.	
	Voluntary civilian arms control [*art. 71, paras. 416-417*]	Assistance with demobilization of combatants.	6,232 ex-combatants demobilized under the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.	
	Disarmament and demobilization of Movements' combatants [*art. 72, paras. 422 and 430-432*] — UNAMID "support and monitoring"	Training on community policing, including on providing security in internally displaced person camps and along migration routes		

B. Intercommunal conflict

Security Council resolution 2363 (2017)	*Provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*	*Role of UNAMID*	*Institutional arrangements: progress to date*	*Legal policy arrangements: progress to date*
Support mediation				
Through supporting local conflict resolution mechanisms by working with Government of the Sudan, tribal and militia leaders	Joint coordination committees to deal with early warning and prevention of escalation: local Government and native administrations are empowered to address consequences of the conflict [*art. 13, para. 86*]	Technical and logistical support to local conflict resolution mechanisms in coordination with the United Nations country team. Develop an action plan on prevention and resolution of inter-communal conflict in each State of Darfur	Joint coordination committees established in all five Darfur States	
Addressing root causes of conflict				
Support implementation of a legal and institutional framework to address root causes of conflict	Modify the laws to include rights to land and its use (*hawakeer*) [*art. 33, para. 182*]	Demarcation of migratory routes and rehabilitation of *rihoods* (natural water points)		Work on Land Act ongoing. Not adopted to date.
	Establish mechanisms to ensure sustainable management and use of lands and other natural resources [*art. 33, para. 186*]	In coordination with the United Nations country team, provision of technical assistance and logistical support to the residual bodies of the Darfur Regional Authority	Relevant residual bodies of the Darfur Regional Authority (Darfur Land Commission, Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission and Voluntary Return and Resettlement Commission) have yet to be established in Darfur. Their heads were appointed in January 2017, but based in Khartoum. Their mandate is still unclear and their capacity very limited.	
	Darfur States land use mapping database developed [*art. 38, para. 197*]			90 per cent of mapping database completed

Security Council resolution 2363 (2017)	*Provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*	*Role of UNAMID*	*Institutional arrangements: progress to date*	*Legal policy arrangements: progress to date*
	Darfur Land Commission exercising full competences [*art. 38, paras. 196-207*]		Darfur Land Commission established	
	Darfur States to be represented by three non-permanent members in the National Petroleum Commission [*art. 41, para. 214*]			
	Oil-producing states to benefit 2 per cent of oil revenue [*art. 41, para. 215*]			

C. Mediation between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory armed movements

Security Council resolution 2363 (2017)	*Provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*	*Role of UNAMID*	*Institutional arrangements: progress to date*	*Legal policy arrangements: progress to date*
Support peace process				
Focus on negotiations on cessation of hostilities	Ceasefire Commission and role of UNAMID [*art. 64, paras. 342 and 348-353*]	Support process led by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel	Ceasefire Commission established in 2011	
		Force Commander, as Chair of the Ceasefire Commission		
	Joint Commission resolving disputes between the parties, referred by the Ceasefire Commission [*art. 65, paras. 366-369*]	Joint Special Representative as Chair of the Joint Commission	Joint Commission established in 2011	
	Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission, as part of the Darfur Regional Authority to implement security arrangements [*art. 74, paras. 448-451*]	Member of the Commission	Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation Commission established in 2012 as part of the Darfur Regional Authority	

Security Council resolution 2363 (2017)	*Provisions of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*	*Role of UNAMID*	*Institutional arrangements: progress to date*	*Legal/policy arrangements: progress to date*
Support residual bodies of the Darfur Regional Authority				
Focus on return, internal dialogue, justice, reconciliation and land	See "Addressing root causes of conflict" above	In coordination with the United Nations country team, provide technical assistance and logistical support to residual bodies of the Darfur Regional Authority		
Support implementation of the Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation				
	Darfur Internal Dialogue and Consultation as a popular consultation to consolidate peace in Darfur [*art. 76, para. 473*]	Facilitate and provide logistical support. Advocate for inclusion of outcomes in the constitutional review process	Mechanism in place. Close to completion. One locality remaining from the third and final phase	Modalities in place
	Facilitation, logistical support and funding [*art. 76, paras. 474-478*]			

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The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 2364 (2017) and 2359 (2017), concerning the situation in Mali,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali, *emphasizing* that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability and security throughout the territory of Mali, and *underscoring* the importance of achieving national ownership of peace- and security-related initiatives,

Recognizing the legitimate aspiration of all Malian citizens to enjoy lasting peace and development,

Recognizing that the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali ("the Agreement") signed in 2015 by the Government of Mali, the *Plateforme* coalition of armed groups, and the *Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad* coalition of armed groups, and its continued implementation, represents a historic opportunity to achieve lasting peace in Mali,

Condemning the repeated violations of the ceasefire arrangements by the *Plateforme* and *Coordination* armed groups in the Kidal and Menaka regions, *urging* them to cease hostilities, to strictly adhere to the ceasefire arrangements and to resume a constructive dialogue without delay for the full implementation of the Agreement, and *welcoming* to this extent the recent signing of a truce agreement on 23 August 2017 in Bamako,

Recognizing the recent progress achieved for the implementation of the Agreement, including the establishment of all interim administrations in the North, *while expressing* its deep concern over the persistent delays for its full implementation two years after it was concluded, and *highlighting* the pressing need to deliver tangible and visible peace dividends to the population in the North and other parts of Mali in order to keep the momentum of the Agreement,

Affirming its intention to facilitate, support and follow closely the implementation of the Agreement, *commending* the role played by Algeria and other members of the international mediation team to assist the Malian parties to implement the Agreement, *emphasizing* the need for increased engagement by the members of the international mediation team, and *further emphasizing* the central role the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali should continue to play to support and oversee the implementation of the Agreement,

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Deploring that the slow progress in the implementation of the Agreement, particularly its defence and security provisions, as well as the delayed restructuring of the security sector, have hampered efforts to restore security and the authority of the Malian State and the delivery of basic social services in the North of Mali, and *stressing* the primary responsibility of the Government of Mali, the *Plateforme* and *Coordination* armed groups to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement in order to improve the security situation across Mali and to forestall attempts by terrorist groups to derail the implementation of the Agreement,

Expressing its serious concern about the volatile security situation, especially the expansion of terrorist and other criminal activities into Central and Southern Mali as well as the intensification of criminal activities such as drug trafficking and trafficking in persons in Mali,

Emphasizing that security and stability in Mali are inextricably linked to that of the Sahel and West Africa regions, as well as the situation in Libya and in the North Africa region,

Acknowledging the impact of the situation in Mali on peace and security in the Sahel, as well as on the wider West Africa and North African region,

Expressing its continued concern over the transnational dimension of the terrorist threat in the Sahel region, as well as the serious challenges posed by transnational organized crime in the Sahel region, including arms, drug and cultural property trafficking, the smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons, and its increasing links, in some cases, with terrorism, and *underscoring* the responsibility of the countries in the region in addressing these threats and challenges,

Noting that impunity can encourage a culture of corruption in which trafficking and other criminal interests can thrive, further encouraging instability and insecurity, and *calling for* the Malian government to devote appropriate law enforcement resources in this regard and *encouraging* international, regional and sub-regional cooperation and support to the Malian Government in this endeavour,

Strongly condemning the activities in Mali and in the Sahel region of terrorist organizations, including the *Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest* (MUJAO), Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Eddine, and associated individuals and groups such as Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims), Islamic State in Greater Sahara and Ansaroul Islam, which continue to operate in Mali and constitute a threat to peace and security in the region and beyond, as well as human rights abuses and violence against civilians, notably women and children, committed in Mali and in the region by terrorist groups,

Recalling the listing of MUJAO, the Organisation of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar Eddine and its leader Iyad Ag Ghali, and Al-Mourabitoun on the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions list established pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), and *reiterating its readiness*, under the above-mentioned regime, to sanction further individuals, groups, undertakings and entities who are associated with ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and other listed entities or individuals, including AQIM, Al Mourabitoun and Ansar Eddine, in accordance with the established listing criteria,

Strongly condemning the continuing attacks, including terrorist attacks against civilians, the Malian defense and security forces, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the French forces, *underlining* the need to bring perpetrators, organizers, financiers and sponsors of these reprehensible acts of terrorism to justice, and *urging* the

Government of Mali to take measures to ensure that those responsible for these attacks are held accountable,

Strongly condemning the incidents of kidnapping and hostage-taking with the aim of raising funds or gaining political concessions, *reiterating* its determination to prevent kidnapping and hostage-taking in the Sahel region and to secure the safe release of hostages without ransom payments or political concessions, in accordance with applicable international law, *recalling* its resolutions 2133 (2014), 2253 (2015) and 2368 (2017) and including its call upon all Member States to prevent terrorists from benefitting directly or indirectly from the payment of ransoms or from political concessions and to secure the safe release of hostages and, in this regard, *noting* the publication of the Global Counterterrorism Forum's (GCTF) "Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists",

Strongly condemning all abuses and violations of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law in Mali, including those involving extrajudicial and summary executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions and ill-treatment of persons whose liberty has been restricted, sexual and gender-based violence, as well as killing, maiming, recruitment and use of children, attacks against schools and hospitals, *calling on* all parties to respect the civilian character of schools as such in accordance with international humanitarian law and to cease unlawful and arbitrary detention of all children, and *calling upon* all parties to bring an end to such violations and abuses and to comply with their obligations under applicable international law,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to uphold and respect the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to ensure the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, the safety and protection of civilians receiving assistance and the security of humanitarian personnel operating in Mali, *stressing* the importance of humanitarian assistance being delivered on the basis of need, *reiterating* that all parties must allow and facilitate full, safe, and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to all persons in need across Mali,

Noting with grave concern the involvement of non-state actors, notably terrorist groups, in the destruction of cultural heritage and the trafficking in cultural property and related offences and *further taking note* of the fact that on 27 September 2016 the ICC found Mr Al Mahdi guilty of the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against religious and historical monuments in Timbuktu,

Welcoming the continued action by the French forces, at the request and in support of the Malian authorities, to deter the terrorist threat in the North of Mali,

Welcoming the deployment of the Force Conjointe des Etats du G5 Sahel (FC G5S), *underlining* that the FC-G5S efforts to counter the activities of terrorist groups and other organized criminal groups will contribute to create a more secure environment in the Sahel region, with a view to supporting MINUSMA fulfil its mandate to stabilize Mali,

Commending the role of the European Union Training Mission (EUTM Mali) in Mali in providing training and advice for the Malian Defence and Security Forces, including contributing to the strengthening of civilian authority and respect for human rights, and of the European Union Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP Sahel Mali) in providing strategic advice and training for the Police, Gendarmerie and Garde nationale in Mali,

Recalling the mandate of MINUSMA as outlined in resolution 2364 (2017), *reiterating* its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

for Mali, and for MINUSMA to assist the Malian authorities and the Malian people in their efforts to bring lasting peace and stability to their country, bearing in mind the primary responsibility of the Malian authorities to protect the population, and *welcoming* the stabilizing effect of the international presence in Mali, including MINUSMA,

Recalling the provisions of the Agreement calling upon the Security Council to give its full support to the Agreement, to closely monitor its implementation and, if necessary, to take measures against anyone hindering the implementation of the commitments contained therein or the realization of its objectives,

Recalling the provisions of resolution 2364 (2017) expressing the readiness of the Security Council to consider targeted sanctions against those who take actions to obstruct or threaten the implementation of the Agreement, those who resume hostilities and violate the ceasefire, those who attack and take actions to threaten MINUSMA and other international presences, as well as those who provide support to such attacks and actions,

Taking note of the letter of the Government of Mali to the President of the Security Council of 9 August 2017 underlining that the repeated violations of the ceasefire since the beginning of June 2017, particularly in the Kidal region, pose serious threats to the fragile gains made in implementing the Agreement, and thus requesting the Security Council, in order to address the many obstacles to the implementation of the Agreement, to immediately establish a regime of targeted sanctions against those responsible for obstructing the implementation of the Agreement,

Determining that the situation in Mali continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Travel ban

1. *Decides* that, for an initial period of one year from the date of the adoption of this resolution, all Member States shall take the necessary measures to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of individuals designated by the Committee established pursuant to paragraph 9 below, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

2. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above shall not apply:

(a) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, including religious obligation;

(b) Where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process;

(c) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Mali and stability in the region;

3. *Emphasizes* that violations of the travel ban can undermine the peace, stability or security of Mali, observes that individuals who knowingly facilitate the travel of a listed individual in violation of the travel ban may be determined by the Committee to have met the designation criteria provided for in this resolution and calls upon all parties and all Member States to cooperate with the Committee as well as the Panel of experts established pursuant to paragraph 11 below on the implementation of the travel ban;

Asset freeze

4. *Decides* that, for an initial period of one year from the date of the adoption of this resolution, all Member States shall freeze without delay all funds, other financial assets and economic resources which are on their territories, which are owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the individuals or entities designated by the Committee, or by individuals or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, or by entities owned or controlled by them, and *decides* further that all Member States shall ensure that any funds, financial assets or economic resources are prevented from being made available by their nationals or by any individuals or entities within their territories, directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the individuals or entities designated by the Committee;

5. *Decides* that the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above do not apply to funds, other financial assets or economic resources that have been determined by relevant Member States:

(a) To be necessary for basic expenses, including payment for foodstuffs, rent or mortgage, medicines and medical treatment, taxes, insurance premiums, and public utility charges or exclusively for payment of reasonable professional fees and reimbursement of incurred expenses associated with the provision of legal services in accordance with national laws, or fees or service charges, in accordance with national laws, for routine holding or maintenance of frozen funds, other financial assets and economic resources, after notification by the relevant State to the Committee of the intention to authorize, where appropriate, access to such funds, other financial assets or economic resources and in the absence of a negative decision by the Committee within five working days of such notification;

(b) To be necessary for extraordinary expenses, provided that such determination has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee and has been approved by the Committee;

(c) To be the subject of a judicial, administrative or arbitral lien or judgment, in which case the funds, other financial assets and economic resources may be used to satisfy that lien or judgment provided that the lien or judgment was entered into effect prior to the date of the present resolution, is not for the benefit of a person or entity designated by the Committee, and has been notified by the relevant State or Member States to the Committee;

(d) Where the Committee determines on a case-by-case basis that an exemption would further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation in Mali and stability in the region;

6. *Decides* that Member States may permit the addition to the accounts frozen pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 4 above of interests or other earnings due on those accounts or payments due under contracts, agreements or obligations that arose prior to the date on which those accounts became subject to the provisions of this resolution, provided that any such interest, other earnings and payments continue to be subject to these provisions and are frozen;

7. *Decides* that the measures in paragraph 4 above shall not prevent a designated person or entity from making payment due under a contract entered into prior to the listing of such a person or entity, provided that the relevant States have determined that the payment is not directly or indirectly received by a person or entity designated pursuant to paragraph 4 above, and after notification by the relevant States to the Committee of the intention to make or receive such payments or to authorize, where appropriate, the unfreezing of funds, other financial assets or economic resources for this purpose, 10 working days prior to such authorization;

Designation criteria

8. *Decides* that the measures contained in paragraph 1 shall apply to individuals, and that the measures contained in paragraph 4 shall apply to individuals and entities, as designated for such measures by the Committee as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, the following actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, or stability of Mali:

(a) Engaging in hostilities in violation of the Agreement;

(b) Actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement;

(c) Acting for or on behalf of or at the direction of or otherwise supporting or financing individuals and entities identified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above, including through the proceeds from organized crime, including the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and their precursors originating in or transiting through Mali, the trafficking in persons and the smuggling of migrants, the smuggling and trafficking of arms as well as the trafficking in cultural property;

(d) Involvement in planning, directing, sponsoring, or conducting attacks against: (i) the various entities referenced in the Agreement, including local, regional and state institutions, joint patrols and the Malian Security and Defense forces; (ii) MINUSMA peacekeepers and other UN and associated personnel, including members of the Panel of experts; (iii) international security presences, including the FC-G5S, European Union Missions and French forces;

(e) Obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Mali, or access to, or distribution of, humanitarian assistance in Mali;

(f) Planning, directing, or committing acts in Mali that violate international human rights law or international humanitarian law, as applicable, or that constitute human rights abuses or violations, including those involving the targeting of civilians, including women and children, through the commission of acts of violence (including killing, maiming, torture, or rape or other sexual violence), abduction, enforced disappearance, forced displacement, or attacks on schools, hospitals, religious sites, or locations where civilians are seeking refuge;

(g) The use or recruitment of children by armed groups or armed forces in violation of applicable international law, in the context of the armed conflict in Mali;

New Sanctions Committee

9. *Decides* to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council consisting of all the members of the Council (herein "the Committee"), to undertake to following tasks:

(a) To monitor implementation of the measures imposed in paragraphs 1 and 4 above;

(b) To designate those individuals and entities subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 4, to review information regarding those individuals, and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraph 5 above;

(c) To designate those individuals subject to the measures imposed by paragraph 1, to review information regarding those individuals, and to consider requests for exemptions in accordance with paragraph 2 above;

(d) To establish such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed above;

(e) To encourage a dialogue between the Committee and interested Member States and international, regional and subregional organizations, in particular those in the region, including by inviting representatives of such States or organizations to meet with the Committee to discuss implementation of the measures;

(f) To seek from all States and international, regional and sub-regional organizations whatever information it may consider useful regarding the actions taken by them to implement effectively the measures imposed above;

(g) To examine and take appropriate action on information regarding alleged violations or non-compliance with the measures contained in this resolution;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to make the necessary financial arrangements to enable the Committee to undertake the tasks mentioned in paragraph 9 above;

Panel of experts

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to create, for an initial period of thirteen months from the adoption of this resolution, in consultation with the Committee, a group of up to five experts ("Panel of experts"), under the direction of the Committee, and to make the necessary financial and security arrangements to support the work of the Panel, *expresses* its intent to consider the renewal of this mandate no later than 12 months after the adoption of this resolution, and *decides* that the Panel shall carry out the following tasks:

(a) Assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in this resolution, including through providing the Committee with information relevant to the potential designation at a later stage of individuals who may be engaging in the activities described in paragraph 8 above;

(b) Gather, examine and analyse information from States, relevant United Nations bodies, regional organizations and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures decided in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance;

(c) Provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, an interim update by March, 1, 2018, and a final report by September, 1, 2018, and periodic updates in between;

(d) To assist the Committee in refining and updating information on the list of individuals subject to measures imposed by paragraphs 1 and 4 above, including through the provision of biometric information and additional information for the publicly-available narrative summary of reasons for listing;

(e) To cooperate closely with INTERPOL and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), as appropriate;

12. *Requests* that the Panel of experts has the necessary gender expertise, in line with paragraph 6 of resolution 2242 (2015);

13. *Notes* that the selection process of the experts composing the Panel should prioritize appointing individuals with the strongest qualifications to fulfil the duties described above while paying due regard to the importance of regional and gender representation in the recruitment process;

14. *Directs* the Panel of experts to cooperate with other relevant expert groups established by the Security Council to support the work of its Sanctions Committees, including the Panel of experts established by resolution 1973 (2011) concerning Libya and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team

pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2368 (2017) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities;

15. *Urges* all parties and all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations to ensure cooperation with the Panel of experts and further urges all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel of experts and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites in order for the Panel of experts to execute its mandate;

Role of MINUSMA

16. *Encourages* timely information exchange between MINUSMA and the Panel of experts, and *requests* MINUSMA to assist the Committee and the Panel of experts, within its mandate and capabilities;

Reporting and review

17. *Calls upon* all States, particularly those in the region, to actively implement the measures contained in this resolution and to regularly report to the Committee on the actions they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraphs 1 and 4 above;

18. *Requests* the Committee to report orally, through its Chair, at least once per year to the Council, on the state of the overall work of the Committee, including alongside the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali on the situation in Mali as appropriate, and encourages the Chair to hold regular briefings for all interested Member States;

19. *Requests* the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict and the Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Conflict to share relevant information with the Committee in accordance with paragraph 7 of resolution 1960 (2010) and paragraph 9 of resolution 1998 (2011);

20. *Affirms* that it shall keep the situation in Mali under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in this resolution, including the strengthening through additional measures, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as may be needed at any time in light of the progress achieved in the stabilization of the country and compliance with this resolution;

21. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.